The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
History
The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)
Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
Armies; Military art and science; World War, 1914-1918
The opposing lines have buried themselves in mazes of entrenchment.
On both sides old methods of warfare and weapons forsaken or
forgotten for centuries have again been gradually resorted to. The
“Minenwerfers,” the trench guns, are nothing but the old-fashioned
mortar much improved upon. The jet of liquid fire driven by compressed
air, finds its prototypes in the Greek fire of Constantinople and the
hand-thrown combustibles--boiling oil and burning pitch--of the Middle
Ages.
STRATEGY. The rules of strategy remain immutable. They still consist
in attacking the enemy on one of his wings; in attempting to outflank
him on one side; in trying to cut his line in two by a blow in
the centre; in organizing a system of transportation so that the
necessary forces may be quickly assembled at the points which are to
be attacked or protected; in taking advantage of a superiority due to
the possession of well-organized interior lines. Such are the ancient
basic principles, that, in various combinations, have been applied by
contending armies since the dawn of military science.
_Examples._ When the Germans attacked on the Yser front, their purpose
was twofold: 1st. To outflank the left wing of the Franco-Anglo-Belgian
Army; 2d. To force their way towards Calais and Dunkirk so as to
prevent England from using those harbours for the concentration of her
armies in France.
After her failure on the Yser front, Germany made use of her
superiority in interior lines, composed of the railway lines existing
before the war, supplemented by new ones built as they were needed
for military operations. Owing to her central geographical position,
Germany is able at all times to dispatch forces from the heart of her
Empire to the various fronts; from Russia to the French Front, and
_vice versa_. To these interior lines is due the facility with which
she has quickly concentrated large masses of troops at any desired
point, notably on the Roumanian front at the end of 1916.
When she had firmly consolidated her Western Front she rapidly
collected all her available forces on the Eastern Front in an effort to
crush the Russians.
When, in February, 1916, the Germans launched the gigantic attack
against Verdun, it was with a twofold strategic purpose: 1st. To pierce
the French line between right wing and centre and resume the march on
Paris. 2d. In case of a partial success, to strengthen themselves by
the occupation of Verdun, with a view to preventing the French armies
from reaching the right bank of the Meuse, while at the same time
guarding their own left wing and their communications with Metz, should
circumstances ever force them to withdraw behind the Meuse.
During the autumn of 1915 the French attempted to avail themselves of
the comparative weakness of the Germans due to their campaign against
Russia. A favourable issue would have taken them to Vouziers-Rethel,
and very possibly have caused all the German lines to be withdrawn from
around Rheims and Soissons.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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