The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
History
The Making of a Modern Army and its Operations in the Field: A study based on the experience of three years on the French front (1914-1917)
Radiguet, René-Louis-Jules
Armies; Military art and science; World War, 1914-1918
We might vary these examples. Quite recently, the British troops have
resumed the attack planned in 1915 by the French in Artois. They will
gradually free the North of France and Flanders.
TACTICS. Let us now consider tactical operations as they are conducted
on the battlefield. The formidable field entrenchments constructed by
the Germans have compelled both combatants to transform their artillery
and to change the armament of their infantry.
The manner in which the different arms are employed on the battlefield
has changed but little.
The field artillery has been enormously developed and it has been
necessary to constantly increase the power of the cannons and
howitzers. We shall later on discuss this subject more fully.
The definition of tactics as given by General Pétain, the French
Generalissimo, in the course of his lectures at the “École de Guerre”
has not been modified by the creation of these improved weapons. He
said: “The Artillery conquers the positions, the Infantry occupies
them.”
We will take for example a quite recent military feat which strikingly
establishes the distinction between the strategical and the tactical
operations.
On the 22d day of last October (1917), the French Army in the North,
east of Soissons, scored one of the most important successes of the
year. This operation, carried out on a nine-mile front, was essentially
tactical. It had for object the capture of very important positions
forming a salient in the French lines, which furnished the Germans with
facilities for an offensive return to Soissons. The capture by the
French of _Vaudesson-Allemant_ and the _Malmaison fort_ eliminated the
salient, opened the road to Laon, and exposed the German lines on the
Ailette to an enfilading fire.
This tactical operation was evidently a part of a vast strategical
plan matured by the French and British Commanders-in-Chief. The general
purpose of these operations aims at forcing the Germans to abandon the
North of Belgium and to retreat in France. All the tactical operations
being carried on in Flanders, on the Aisne, in Champagne and Lorraine,
are parts of this single plan and have the same object in view.
[Illustration: BATTLE FIELD OF THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE OF THE 22d OCTOBER,
1917.]
The rapid campaign just conducted by Marshal von Mackensen against the
Italians in the Julian Alps, like that he led in 1916 in the Dobrutcha
and Roumania, are evidences that the old principles of war, and
especially those practised by Napoleon, are still fully adhered to by
the German armies.
=2. Violation of the laws of warfare. Influence of science.= We must
acknowledge that, although the Germans had hoped in 1914 for a quick
victory gained by a few overwhelming blows, they had also, during their
forty-four years military preparation, provided for the possibility
of a check, and had equipped themselves with a mighty artillery which
enabled them to hold the Western Front while fighting against Russia.
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