“The objection is ingenious, but I judge fully met by the declaration of Lord Mansfield in Holman's case: 'The objection,' said the learned judge, 'that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is allowed, but it is founded on the general principle of policy which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice as between himself and plaintiff, by accident, if I may so say. The principle of public policy is this: _ex dolo malo non oritur actio_. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act. If from the plaintiff's own statement or otherwise the cause of action appear to arise _ex turpi causa_, or the transgression of a positive law of this country, then the court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground the court goes, not for the sake of the defendant, but because it will not lend its aid to such a plaintiff.' “This claim of the plaintiff to this action is unsound for the further reason that any promise, contract, or undertaking the performance of which would tend to promote, advance, or carry into effect an object or purpose which is unlawful, is itself void and will not maintain an action. The law which prohibits the end, will not lend its aid in promoting the means assigned to carry it into effect. Nor is it possible for an act contrary to law to be made the basis of a contract enforceable in courts of law. Hence when one lends money to another for the express purpose of enabling him to commit a specific unlawful act, and such act be afterwards committed by means of the aid so received, the lender is a _particeps criminis_, and the law will not aid him to recover money advanced for such a purpose, and much less would it assist him, if, as in this case he retained an interest in the result of the venture.” It was very unusual for counsel to interrupt the judge in the delivery of his opinion, but at this point the attorney for Martin arose. “If your honor please,” he said, “this court is taking away the remedy of the plaintiff, and permitting the wrong to stand. Does this court reverse the ancient doctrine upon which the theory of human justice has its eternal basis, the ancient doctrine that the law will always provide a remedy for a wrong?” The faintest shadow of a smile flitted over the judicial face. “That sage maxim: '_lex semper debit remédiant_,'” answered the judge, “is a gigantic error couched in very good law Latin. The motion to exclude the evidence is sustained, and the jury will find a verdict for the defendants.” X