That there existed no department charged with the duty of constantly representing what was required in ships, men, stores, docks, under peace conditions, or what would be required under war conditions, was obvious enough. But in the course of the execution of my duties as junior lord, it immediately became equally clear that the Navy was deficient in those very matters and things concerning which it would have been the business of such a department to report. Among them was coal, which was in my charge. Not only was there an immense deficiency in the war reserve of coal, but there was no plan for supplying it. What my friends used to call my "craze," which they regarded as an amiable form of lunacy, for organisation for war, showed me that without it, all naval force, though it were twice as powerful, would be practically wasted in the event of emergency. I went to the First Lord and asked him if it would be in order for me to draw up a memorandum on any subject to be laid before the Board. Lord George Hamilton, with his invariable courtesy, replied that any such paper would be gladly considered. Within six weeks of my appointment to the Admiralty, I had drawn my Memorandum on War Organisation calling attention to the necessity of creating a Naval Intelligence Department at the Admiralty. In that document, it was represented: 1. That although recent events had revealed approximately our deficiencies in the event of war with a {346} second-rate maritime Power, no measures had been taken to prepare a plan showing how the requirements were to be met. 2. That other countries possessed departments charged with the duty of preparing plans of campaign and of organising their every detail so that they could be instantly carried into execution. 3. That the deficiencies in the numbers of the personnel known to be required, were such and such. 4. That the Medical stores were deficient in such and such respects. (They were kept in bulk, so that in the event of war, the medical stores would have had to be selected and distributed: a system I was able to alter.) 5. That there existed no organisation of any kind with regard to the use of merchant shipping in war for the transport of coal, ammunition, and stores, and for hospital ships. 6. That there existed no organisation for rapidly mobilising the reserves. 7. That in order rightly to fulfil these requirements, there must be designed plans of campaign to meet all probable contingencies. 8. That in order to obtain such plans of campaign, there should be created a new department charged with the duty of drawing them up. There followed a detailed scheme for a new Intelligence Department, at an increased expense of no more than £2251. The Memorandum concluded as follows: "1. Can it be denied that the gravest and most certain danger exists to the country if the facts stated in this paper are true? "2. Can it be denied that these facts are true?