“Similar conditions apply to command and management; so that, while the building of a modern battleship entails enormous work and responsibility on the naval architect, constructor, and staff, the effective use of her as a tool in the trade of war presents an equal variety and intricacy of problems to students of the art of naval warfare in this college. “Such questions and such problems cannot be relegated to the category of details. Even if we consider the art of naval warfare in the aspects only of strategy and tactics, both will be affected for better or for worse by the behavior and performance of the units composing the force in operation. This being admitted, it follows that the behavior and performance of the units will be as the knowledge and capacity of captains and their staffs, and that no extent of skill and capacity in the admiral directing the whole can overcome or evade the consequences of incapacity and failure on the part of a captain commanding a part. “As the speed of any fleet is that of its slowest ship, so will its manœuvring power be limited by the capacity of its poorest captain. As it might easily happen that the slowest or least handy ship and the poorest captain would be joined, the quality of the other ships and the ability of the other officers would go for nothing. “In view of the complex character of the ships themselves, and the difficulty and danger of manœuvring them under the most favorable conditions, as pointed out, the experience of the first general action will demonstrate the necessity of having all the battleships in a fleet as nearly alike as possible in size, type, and capacity of performance. Such provision would not equalize the personal factor of different commanding officers, but it would at least give them all an equal chance at the start. “For this reason I have always considered it unwise to multiply types or to modify seriously those which the best judgment we are able to form approves. “These considerations seem conclusive against multiplication of types, and in favor of adhering to one that plainly meets the requirements of our national situation and policy. “The composition of a battleship fleet under such conditions would minimize the tactical dangers and difficulties referred to earlier, but they would still remain very great, and nothing can mitigate them except frequent and arduous drill in squadron of evolution, so that our captains may become familiar with their weapons before being called upon to use them in actual battle. There will be scant opportunity to drill a battleship squadron after the outbreak of war.