2. But at any rate the primary object of Ethics is not to determine what ought to be done in an ideal society: it therefore does not necessarily require as a preliminary the theoretical construction of such a society. 18-22 CHAPTER III ETHICAL JUDGMENTS 1. By ‘Reasonable’ conduct--whether morally or prudentially reasonable--we mean that of which we judge that it ‘ought’ to be done. Such a judgment cannot be legitimately interpreted as a judgment concerning facts, nor as referring exclusively to the _means_ to ulterior ends: in particular, the term ‘ought,’ as used in moral judgments, does not merely signify that the person judging feels a specific emotion: 23-28 2. nor does it merely signify that the conduct in question is prescribed under penalties: 28-31 3. The notion expressed by “ought,” in its strictest ethical use is too elementary to admit of formal definition, or of resolution into simpler notions; it is assumed to be objectively valid; and judgments in which it is used when they relate to the future conduct of the person judging, are accompanied by a special kind of impulse to action. 31-35 4. This ‘dictate of reason’ is also exemplified by merely prudential judgments; and by merely hypothetical imperatives. 35-38 CHAPTER IV PLEASURE AND DESIRE 1. The psychological doctrine, that the object of Desire is always Pleasure, is liable to collide with the view of Ethical judgments just given: and in any case deserves careful examination. 39-42 2. If by “pleasure” is meant “agreeable feeling,” this doctrine is opposed to experience: for throughout the whole scale of our desires, from the highest to the lowest, we can distinguish impulses directed towards other ends than our own feelings from the desire of pleasure: 42-51 3. as is further shown by the occasional conflict between the two kinds of impulse. 51-52 4. Nor can the doctrine derive any real support from consideration either of the ‘unconscious’ or the ‘original’ aim of human action. 52-54 Note 54-56 CHAPTER V FREE WILL 1. The Kantian identification of ‘Free’ and ‘Rational’ action is misleading from the ambiguity of the term ‘freedom.’ 57-59 2. When, by definition and analysis of voluntary action, the issue in the Free Will Controversy has been made clear, it appears that the cumulative argument for Determinism is almost overwhelming: 59-65