3. still it is impossible to me in acting not to regard myself as free to do what I judge to be reasonable. However the solution of the metaphysical question of Free Will is not important--Theology apart--for systematic Ethics generally: 65-70 4. it seems however to have a special relation to the notion of Justice: 71-72 5. The practical unimportance of the question of Free Will becomes more clear if we scrutinize closely the range of volitional effects.72-76 CHAPTER VI ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND METHODS 1. The Methods indicated in chap. i. have a _prima facie_ claim to proceed on reasonable principles: other principles seem, in so far as they can be made precise, to reduce themselves to these: 77-80 2. especially the principle of “living according to Nature.” 80-83 3. In short, all varieties of Method may conveniently be classed under three heads: Intuitionism and the two kinds of Hedonism, Egoistic and Universalistic. The common confusion between the two latter is easily explained, but must be carefully guarded against. 83-87 Note 87-88 CHAPTER VII EGOISM AND SELF-LOVE 1. To get a clear idea of what is commonly known as Egoism, we must distinguish and exclude several possible meanings of the term: 89-93 2. and define its end as the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain for the agent,--pleasures being valued in proportion to their pleasantness. 93-95 CHAPTER VIII INTUITIONISM 1. I apply the term Intuitional--in the narrower of two legitimate senses--to distinguish a method in which the rightness of some kinds of action is assumed to be known without consideration of ulterior consequences. 96-98 2. The common antithesis between Intuitive and Inductive is inexact, since this method does not necessarily proceed from the universal to the particular. We may distinguish Perceptional Intuitionism, according to which it is always the rightness of some particular action that is held to be immediately known: 98-100 3. Dogmatic Intuitionism, in which the general rules of Common Sense are accepted as axiomatic: 100-101 4. Philosophical Intuitionism, which attempts to find a deeper explanation for these current rules. 101-103 Note 103-104 CHAPTER IX GOOD 1. Another important variety of Intuitionism is constituted by substituting for “right” the wider notion “good.” 105-106 2. The common judgment that a thing is “good” does not on reflection appear to be equivalent to a judgment that it is directly or indirectly pleasant. 106-109