1. The duty of obeying Laws, though it may to a great extent be included under Justice, still requires a separate treatment. We can, however, obtain no _consensus_ for any precise definition of it. 295-297 2. For we are neither agreed as to what kind of government is ideally legitimate, 297-299 3. nor as to the criterion of a traditionally legitimate government, 299-301 4. nor as to the proper limits of governmental authority. 301-303 5. The duty of fulfilling a promise in the sense in which it was understood by both promiser and promisee is thought to be peculiarly stringent and certain 303-304 6. (it being admitted that its obligation is relative to the promisee, and may be annulled by him, and that it cannot override strict prior obligations). 304-305 7. But Common Sense seems to doubt how far a promise is binding when it has been obtained by force or fraud: 305-306 8. or when circumstances have materially altered since it was made--especially if it be a promise to the dead or absent, from which no release can be obtained, or if the performance of the promise will be harmful to the promisee, or inflict a disproportionate sacrifice on the promiser. 306-308 9. Other doubts arise when a promise has been misapprehended: and in the peculiar case where a prescribed form of words has been used. 308-311 CHAPTER VII CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES. TRUTH 1. I have not adopted the classification of duties into Social and Self-regarding: as it seems inappropriate to the Intuitional method, of which the characteristic is, that it lays down certain absolute and independent rules: such as the rule of Truth. 312-315 2. But Common Sense after all scarcely seems to prescribe truth-speaking under all circumstances: nor to decide clearly whether the beliefs which we are bound to make true are those directly produced by our words or the immediate inferences from these. 315-317 3. It is said that the general allowance of Unveracity would be suicidal, as no one would believe the falsehood. But this argument, though forcible, is not decisive; for (1) this result may be in special circumstances desirable, or (2) we may have reason to expect that it will not occur. 317-319 Note 319 CHAPTER VIII OTHER SOCIAL DUTIES AND VIRTUES