1. Common opinion sometimes condemns sweepingly malevolent feelings and volitions: but Reflective Common Sense seems to admit some as legitimate, determining the limits of this admission on utilitarian grounds. 320-324 2. Other maxims of social duty seem clearly subordinate to those already discussed: as is illustrated by an examination of Liberality and other cognate notions. 324-326 CHAPTER IX SELF-REGARDING VIRTUES 1. The general duty of seeking one’s own happiness is commonly recognised under the notion of Prudence. 327-328 2. This as specially applied to the control of bodily appetites is called Temperance: but under this notion a more rigid restraint is sometimes thought to be prescribed: though as to the principle of this there seems no agreement. 328-329 3. Nor is it easy to give a clear definition of the maxim of Purity--but in fact common sense seems averse to attempt this. We must note, however, that suicide is commonly judged to be absolutely wrong. 329-331 CHAPTER X COURAGE, HUMILITY, ETC. 1. The Duty of Courage is subordinate to those already discussed: and in drawing the line between the Excellence of Courage and the Fault of Foolhardiness we seem forced to have recourse to considerations of expediency. 332-334 2. Similarly the maxim of Humility seems either clearly subordinate or not clearly determinate. 334-336 CHAPTER XI REVIEW OF THE MORALITY OF COMMON SENSE 1. We have now to examine the moral maxims that have been defined, to ascertain whether they possess the characteristics of scientific intuitions. 337-338 2. We require of an Axiom that it should be (1) stated in clear and precise terms, (2) really self-evident, (3) not conflicting with any other truth, (4) supported by an adequate ‘consensus of experts.’ These characteristics are not found in the moral maxims of Common Sense. 338-343 3. The maxims of Wisdom and Self-control are only self-evident in so far as they are tautological: 343-345 4. nor can we state any clear, absolute, universally-admitted axioms for determining the duties of the Affections: 345-349 5. and as for the group of principles that were extracted from the common notion of Justice, we cannot define each singly in a satisfactory manner, still less reconcile them: 349-352 6. and even the Duty of Good Faith, when we consider the numerous qualifications of it more or less doubtfully admitted by Common Sense, seems more like a subordinate rule than an independent First Principle. Still more is this the case with Veracity: 352-355