no part of my plan to call special attention to this “Dualism of the Practical Reason” as I have elsewhere called it: but I am surprised at the extent to which my view has perplexed even those of my critics who have understood it. I had imagined that they would readily trace it to the source from which I learnt it, Butler’s well-known Sermons. I hold with Butler that “Reasonable Self-love and Conscience are the two chief or superior principles in the nature of man,” each of which we are under a “manifest obligation” to obey: and I do not (I believe) differ materially from Butler in my view either of reasonable self-love, or--theology apart--of its relation to conscience. Nor, again, do I differ from him in regarding conscience as essentially a function of the practical Reason: “moral precepts,” he says in the _Analogy_ (Part II. chap. viii.), “are precepts the reason of which we see.” My difference only begins when I ask myself, ‘What among the precepts of our common conscience do we really see to be ultimately reasonable?’ a question which Butler does not seem to have seriously put, and to which, at any rate, he has given no satisfactory answer. The answer that I found to it supplied the rational basis that I had long perceived to be wanting to the Utilitarianism of Bentham, regarded as an ethical doctrine: and thus enabled me to transcend the commonly received antithesis between Intuitionists and Utilitarians. FOOTNOTES: [1] I did not mean to exclude the supposition that two or more alternatives might under certain circumstances be equally right (1884). [2] This statement now appears to me to require a slight modification (1884). [3] Cf. _Mind_, No. 2. [4] Among unpublished criticisms I ought especially to mention the valuable suggestions that I have received from Mr. Carveth Read; to whose assistance in revising the present edition many of my corrections are due. PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION