Now Dr. Watson, when he assumes that because he finds no consciousness in his subjects there is therefore no such thing as consciousness, is entirely justified--if he is himself an unconscious man. But I fancy he is merely paying us the compliment of confusing himself with us. He is unable to put his hands upon _our_ minds or feelings because they are forever hidden within us, and will never, never, never permit themselves to be isolated, taken apart and chemically analyzed. That which is objective is conduct--it is not feeling. Certain light waves are felt as redness--but the waves are not the redness. Outside ourselves, everything of red exists, saving and excepting only its redness. Now is or is not redness an important part of red? The brain is indeed but a few billion neurones, slightly damp. Dr. Watson, fumbling among them, sees only certain motions of matter. Naturally he sees no mind. But he modestly forgets that all the while he is observing these motions of ours and attributing them to other motions, and these to yet other motions, and so on _ad infinitum_, he is using his own mind--and a very ingenious mind it is, thus to reason itself out of existence. We all remember how granny used to lose her specs and look for them everywhere--through the very specs in question, which were all the while on the end of her nose. Consciousness is a fact of consciousness, the most obtrusive fact in all the world. But it is not a fact outside of consciousness. There it is only an inference. Should Dr. Watson get hit on the head by a brick falling from his laboratory chimney (which God forbid!), he would not be immediately able to observe whether a dog’s salivary secretions were increased by the sight and smell of chocolate or not. Knowledge of glands can “amplify our conception,”[14] says Levine, “but it by no means abolishes the need for a mental state.” “Not even by poetic license,” adds Sidney Hook,[15] “can the earth be created through a deft masonry of its derivative effects.” Neither can the mind. Or as J. R. Kantor, of the University of Indiana, expresses it in his “Principles of Psychology,”--“The writers who hold such doctrines [that psychology is a matter of neuro-muscular or neuro-glandular responses] inevitably face the consequence of neglecting the description of most of the actual content not only of human but of animal psychology.” Says William James,[16] “Cases ... prove the existence in our mental machinery of a sense of present reality more diffused and general than that which our special senses yield.... Nothing would be more natural than to connect it with the muscular sense.... But our interest lies with the faculty rather than its organic seat.... Something in you absolutely _knows_ that result to be truer than any logic-chopping, rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict it.”