The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazineVarious
Philosophy
The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazine
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
In a word, then (without attempting to show the insufficiency of
inductive logic as the theory of science by reference to its treatment
of specific points) inductive logic does not meet our needs because it
is not a free, unprejudiced inquiry into the special forms and methods
of science, starting from the actual sciences themselves. It is founded
and built up with constant reference to the scholastic notion of thought.
Where it is not affected positively by it, it is still affected by its
reaction from it. Instead of denying once for all validity or even sense
to the notion of thinking as a special, apart process, and then beginning
a free, unhampered examination with an eye single to the fact of science
itself, it retains this conception of thought as valid in a certain
department, and then sets out to find something to supply the gap in
another department. And thus we have the usual division of inductive and
deductive logic, inductive being interpreted as empirical and particular,
deductive as syllogistic and formal. They are counterpart and correlative
theories, the two sides of the notion of the separateness of fact and
thought; they stand and fall together.
“Transcendental” logic, while usually conceived as utterly opposed in
spirit and in results to inductive logic, has yet been one with it
in endeavoring to abolish formal logic as the sufficient method and
criterion of scientific truth. I say this although well aware that
inductive logic is usually conceived as specifically “scientific,” while
the transcendental movement is regarded as the especial foe of science—as
a belated attempt to restore an _a priori_ scholasticism, and to find
a scheme for evolving truth out of pure thought. This is because when
the “transcendental” school talks of thought, of the synthetic and
objective character of thought, of the possibility of attaining absolute
truth through thought, and of the ontological value of thought, it is
understood as meaning thought in the old, scholastic sense, a process
apart and fixed in itself, and yet somehow evolving truth out of its own
inner being, out of its own enclosed ruminations. But on the contrary,
the very meaning of “transcendentalism” is not only that it is impossible
to get valid truth from the evolution of thought in the scholastic sense,
but that there is no such thought at all. Processes of intelligence which
have their nature fixed in themselves, apart from fact and having to
be externally applied to fact, are pure myths to his school. Types of
thought are simply the various forms which reality progressively takes
as it is progressively mastered as to its meaning,—that is, understood.
Methods of thought are simply the various active attitudes into which
intelligence puts itself in order to detect and grasp the fact. Instead
of rigid moulds, they are flexible adaptations. Methods of thought fit
fact more closely and responsively than a worn glove fits the hand. They
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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