Is there not more than one kind or type of self-consistency possible, as when self-indulgence is restricted simply within the bounds of health and decency? This is the question whether consistency demands completeness, i. e. whether mere omission destroys consistency. It has often been discussed, and I suppose the general answer is that _assuming the unity of the total moral movement_, any elements omitted in any portion of the movement must ultimately have their revenge by producing disturbance. Then if we ask what after all is the relation of the theoretical reason to the reasonable will or moral reason, the only answer seems to be that the moral reason, in the individual or in the race, is the body of intellectual ideas which are in fact predominant as purposes in either, having become predominant by the power they have shown of crushing out or adjusting to themselves the active associations of all other ideas. And the power is what might be described as logical power; that is to say it depends on the range and depth which enables one idea to include in itself as in a system a great variety of minor purposes. The intellect as such is for morality in the first instance simply the medium in which the moral world or content of the moral world exists; and which therefore conveys to that content its own peculiar character of system and totality. Then, further, in theoretical reflection on the moral world, I imagine that we notice this predominance of ideas which have organising power, and we frame to express this predominance such predicates as important, right, good. And the whole of these judgments we must call wisdom as opposed to knowledge. But I cannot myself see how these or any judgments can be judgments of the moral reason. They seem to me to be, as judgments, necessarily judgments of the theoretic reason dealing with the facts of the moral world. But then there is the further complication that these judgments themselves, forming the content of intellectual ideas, may, if they have organising power, become actively predominant, and then again they will form a portion of the actual moral world as general ideas or clues, inciting to the active search for concrete ideas which are concordant with them. In this case they are not acting _as_ judgments, which are true and false, but only as dominant contents. It is one thing to judge that there is a right in the moral world, and another thing to be mastered by the right in one’s own mind. If I am asked, what I mean by the predominance of dominant ideas, which I allege to form the content of the reasonable will, I start from the position that every idea would produce action if unchecked, simply by suggestions which through associative reproductions call up the necessary movement. Desire may, I believe, or may not intervene, as a state of tension between a pain of want and a pleasure produced by an idea. All that is essential, it appears to me, is this idea which can suggest an action.