In the formed life of a civilised man the organising ideas have long asserted their predominant power, and in every moment crush out countless intruders each of which has in itself suggestions quite capable of leading to action. In childhood or insanity the yielding to every suggestion is a mark of what is called absence or loss of will; that is, not the loss of a _general_ power to check minor suggestions, but of perfectly _definite_ habitual purposes which check them as a matter of course. This view sounds no doubt like an iron Determinism, and I am not much concerned to defend it from that imputation. After all, if we are determined by the content of our own minds, why then I suppose we determine ourselves. And trivial examples of indifferent alternatives such as “I can blow out this candle or not as I please” seem to me very poor representatives of the moral will, compared with the necessary pressure of an over-mastering idea which drives the man up to the point of saying, “This is what must be decisive with one like me, and I have no alternative.” We feel, as we say, that “we shall have to do it.” Almost all really serious action, it seems to me, is of this type. And if I have read at all correctly this lesson of the new psychology which owes its origin largely to Herbart, it is an instructive meeting of extremes, that the most analytic of psychologies should more than ever represent the individual as the incarnation of a progressive order in ideas. B. BOSANQUET. ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE.[4]