The nature of the physical worldEddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Philosophy
The nature of the physical world
Eddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir
Physics -- Philosophy; Science -- Philosophy
Hitherto I have only considered the waves corresponding to one
electron; now suppose that we have a problem involving two electrons.
How shall they be represented? “Surely, that is simple enough! We
have only to take two stormy areas instead of one.” I am afraid not.
[Pg 219]
Two stormy areas would correspond to a single electron uncertain as
to which area it was located in. So long as there is the faintest
probability of the first electron being in any region, we cannot make
the Schrödinger waves there represent a probability belonging to a
second electron. Each electron wants the whole of three-dimensional
space for its waves; so Schrödinger generously allows three dimensions
for each of them. For two electrons he requires a six-dimensional
sub-aether. He then successfully applies his method on the same lines
as before. I think you will see now that Schrödinger has given us what
seemed to be a comprehensible physical picture only to snatch it away
again. His sub-aether does not exist in physical space; it is in a
“configuration space” imagined by the mathematician for the purpose of
solving his problems, and imagined afresh with different numbers of
dimensions according to the problem proposed. It was only an accident
that in the earliest problems considered the configuration space had
a close correspondence with physical space, suggesting some degree of
objective reality of the waves. Schrödinger’s wave-mechanics is not a
physical theory but a dodge—and a very good dodge too.
The fact is that the almost universal applicability of this
wave-mechanics spoils all chance of our taking it seriously as a
physical theory. A delightful illustration of this occurs incidentally
in the work of Dirac. In one of the problems, which he solves by
Schrödinger waves, the frequency of the waves represents the number of
systems of a given kind. The wave-equation is formulated and solved,
and (just as in the problem of the hydrogen atom) it is found that
solutions only exist for a series of special values of the frequency.
Consequently the number of systems of the kind considered must have
[Pg 220]
one of a discrete series of values. In Dirac’s problem the series
turns out to be the series of integers. Accordingly we infer that the
number of systems must be either 1, 2, 3, 4, ..., but can never be 2¾
for example. It is satisfactory that the theory should give a result
so well in accordance with our experience! But we are not likely to
be persuaded that the true explanation of why we count in integers is
afforded by a system of waves.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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