By a _ruse de guerre_, or stratagem of war, I understand the adoption of some means of deceiving the enemy in war, some device out of the ordinary course of fighting. The old adage that ‘all is fair in love and war’ is not strictly true, for some stratagems are not unjustifiable in war, and some are. The _Emden_, when she rigged up a fourth funnel, so making believe she was some other ship, resorted to a legitimate stratagem which had unfortunate results for our Allies’ ships in Penang harbour. The German soldiers who put on our dead men’s uniforms also resort to a stratagem; but we are fastidious in our methods of fighting, and do not admit that this is ‘playing the game’ of war. But, whether legitimate or illegitimate, these are _ruses de guerre_; and the term is hardly applicable to a stratagem adopted by a non-combatant to avoid an unlawful trap set by the enemy for his destruction. _The First American Note to Great Britain_ I pass now to the more serious matter of the Note of friendly protest of the 28th of December, which was an amplification of one already presented on the 7th of November. It opens with the declaration that the present condition of the trade of the United States, resulting from frequent seizures and detentions of cargoes destined to neutral European ports, has become so serious as to require a candid statement of the view of the United States Government that the British policy is an infringement of the rights of its citizens, and denies to neutral commerce the freedom to which it is entitled by the law of nations. An improvement had been confidently awaited on account of the statement of the Foreign Office that the British Government ‘were satisfied with guarantees offered by the Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish Governments as to the non-exportation of contraband goods when consigned to named persons in the territories of those Governments.’ But although nearly five months had passed since the War began, it was a matter of deep regret to find that the British Government have not materially changed their policy and do not treat less injuriously ships and cargoes passing between neutral ports in the peaceful pursuit of lawful commerce which belligerents should protect rather than interrupt. The greater freedom from detention and seizure which was confidently expected to result from consigning shipments to definite consignees rather than ‘to order’ is still awaited. The general principle is then laid down that, ‘seeing that peace, and not war, is the normal relation between nations,’ the commerce between countries which are not belligerents should not be interfered with by those at war unless such interference is manifestly an imperative necessity to protect their national safety, and then only to the extent that it is a necessity.