The two chambers are in accord on the text of a law which the President does not approve; this is the first kind of conflict. In such a case, unless the President wants to promulgate the law adopted, he must submit the text to a referendum (Article 73, par. 2). It is in effect a very strong right of veto given to the President and accorded to him without much difficulty. The Independents, however, in accordance with their thesis of the uselessness of the President, did not want to grant this right to appeal to the people in such a case, except to a responsible minister. Also the members of the German People’s Party opposed the granting of this power as useless, being a duplication of the President’s right to dissolve Parliament. The majority of the Assembly, however, disagreed with them. The German Nationals saw in this measure new opportunity to strengthen the authority of the President and did not let the occasion escape them. The parties of the coalition, on the other hand, felt that in investing the President with these powers they only applied logically their democratic principles. The referendum appeared to them, in addition in this particular case, less of an increase of the President’s powers than as a corrective of the fact that he has powers too great. A democracy, according to them, can with less risk give itself a strong executive, if it also includes among them his right to call a referendum in case of conflict, which would thereby enable the people to rule on the conflict. On the other hand, the supporters of the principle of separation of powers supported this use of the referendum, which seemed to them more in conformity with their principles than the power to dissolve the Reichstag. Another kind of conflict which can arise between the Reichstag and the President is not merely a question of legislation but of general policy. According to the terms of Article 43, par. 2, “the President may be removed by the vote of the people on proposal of the National Assembly.” This provision was adopted without discussion and its presence in the German Constitution is quite understandable. The National Assembly wished to create a strong president; in fact, it has given him almost absolute power. He is the man entrusted by the people along with the Reichstag and the Cabinet. If he betrays this trust who other than the people themselves should decide that? But if he has retained the confidence of the people, what is there to fear from his being brought before it as a tribunal? In addition to this Article 43 specifies wisely that the vote, whereby the Reichstag decides to place the question of removal of the President before the public, must be a majority of two-thirds. Finally the same Article logically provides that if the people pronounce against the removal of the President in such an instance, the Reichstag is thereby dissolved, for it is the latter in such a situation that has ceased to be in contact with the people.