What would be the political consequence of this geographical extension southward? We all know the blood differences between Southerner and Northerner in German politics. The North with a Protestant and Prussian mentality, a bureaucratic and burgher government, an efficient and energetic morale, a land of big business and big battalions; and the south a Catholic and conservative mentality, an easy-going and eclectic morale, a land of fat farms and the fine arts. And war and revolution have only changed without lessening these differences. The new Austrian province in the south would have acted as ballast to steady the rollings of the Ship of State, top-heavy with its northern profiteers and proletariat. Nor would we be right if we assumed from the short-lived Räte-Republik of Munich that Vienna would bring an accession of strength to the Communists. It is the clerical Centrum, Parliamentary Government and Federalism that would have benefited from the Union. And, not only as a community, but as individuals, Austrians would have a useful political _rôle_ in the new German democracy. Some of us may have noticed how the Bavarians and Rheinländers come to the front in Germany as liberal speakers and writers. The Austrians would have brought a like leaven into the lump of half-baked German civilisation. The Austrian in all the elegancies of life is as superior to the German as he is inferior to him in all life's efficiencies. Finally, they would have served as interpreters and intermediaries between Germans and other races. It is as difficult to dislike an Austrian as to like a Prussian. As to the material effect of the Union, we find that the total population of the German Republic after union would have been no more than was that of the German Empire before the war. At the beginning of the war the latter was 68 millions. Up to January, 1919, the excess of deaths over births was 700,000, the war casualties 1.8 millions. Losses in Alsace-Lorraine, Posen and Schleswig will reduce this, at least, to 61 millions and probably to below 60 millions. German-Austria cannot bring in more than 9 millions and may bring in as little as 6 millions. So that Germany would about have regained in the south what it has lost in the east, north and west. Now, as to money. The public debt of Austria, without Hungary, was 83.17 milliard kronen. This has still to be apportioned among the new national States; but even on the most favourable basis for German-Austria, that of population, it will mean a debt of about 30 milliard kronen with an annual charge of 1.5 milliards. This will mean a much heavier charge per head than that in Germany. The note circulation was 37.5 milliards, of which less than 10 per cent. is secured in gold; and a restoration of the currency will therefore be a costly business.