For example, after leaving the orange, in five minutes we return. A new first crude thought-object of perception presents itself to us, indistinguishable from the half-minute orange we previously experienced; it is in the same fruit-basket. We aggregate the two presentations of an orange into the same orange. By such aggregations we obtain "second crude thought-objects of perception." But however far we can proceed with aggregation of this type, the orange is more than that. For example, what do we mean when we say, The orange is in the cupboard, if Tom has not eaten it? The world of present fact is more than a stream of sense-presentation. We find ourselves with emotions, volitions, imaginations, conceptions, and judgments. No factor which enters into consciousness is by itself or even can exist in isolation. We are analysing certain relations between sense-presentation and other factors of consciousness. Hitherto we have taken into account merely the factors of concept and judgment. Imagination is necessary to complete the orange, namely, the imagination of hypothetical sense-presentations. It is beside the point to argue whether we ought to have such imaginations, or to discuss what are the metaphysical truths concerning reality to which they correspond. We are here only concerned with the fact that such imaginations exist and essentially enter into the formation of the concepts of the thought-objects of perception which are the first data of science. We conceive the orange as a permanent collection of sense-presentations existing as if they were an actual element in our consciousness, which they are not. The orange is thus conceived as in the cupboard with its shape, odour, colour, and other qualities. Namely, we imagine hypothetical possibilities of sense-presentation, and conceive their want of actuality in our consciousness as immaterial to their existence in fact. The fact which is essential for science is our conception; its meaning in regard to the metaphysics of reality is of no scientific importance, so far as physical science is concerned. The orange completed in this way is the thought-object of perception. It must be remembered that the judgments and concepts arising in the formation of thought-objects of perception are in the main instinctive judgments, and instinctive concepts, and are not concepts and judgments consciously sought for and consciously criticised before adoption. Their adoption is facilitated by and interwoven with the expectation of the future in which the hypothetical passes into the actual, and also with the further judgment of the existence of other consciousnesses, so that much that is hypothetical to one consciousness is judged to be actual to others.