The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and WrongBrentano, Franz
Philosophy
The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong
Brentano, Franz
Ethics
In the notes, individual points are more sharply defined, a very
detailed examination of which would have been too prolix in the lecture.
Many an objection already urged has been met, many an expected rejoinder
anticipated. I also hope that some will be interested in the several
historical contributions, especially in the inquiries concerning
Descartes, where I trace back the doctrine of evidence to its causes and
point out two further thoughts, one of which has been misunderstood, the
other scarcely noticed, neither treated with the consideration they
deserve. I refer to his fundamental classification of mental states and
to his doctrine of the relation of love to joy, and of hate to sadness.
With several highly honoured investigators of the present--assuredly not
least honoured by myself--I have entered into a polemical debate, and
indeed most vigorously with those whose previous attack has compelled
me to a defence. I hope that they do not regard it as a violation of
_their_ claims, when I seek, to the utmost of my power, to help the
truth, which we in common serve, to her rights, and I assure them in
turn, that as I myself speak frankly, so also none the less do I welcome
with all my heart every sincere word of my opponent.
FRANZ BRENTANO.
CONTENTS
THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF RIGHT AND WRONG
A LECTURE
PAGE
1. Value of History and Philosophy for Jurisprudence; the new proposals
for the reform of legal studies in Austria 1
2. Our theme; Relation to Ihering’s lecture before the Vienna Law
Society 2
3. Twofold meaning of the expression “natural right” 2
4. Points of agreement with Ihering; rejection of the “jus naturae”
and “jus gentium”; pre-ethical political statutes 3
5. Opposition to Ihering; There exists a universally valid naturally
recognizable moral law. Relative independence of the question 4
6. The notion “natural sanction” 4
7. Manifold misconception of the same by philosophers 6
8. Habitually developed feeling of compulsion as such is no sanction 6
9. Motives of hope and fear as such not yet sanction 6
10. The thought of the arbitrary command of a higher power is not the
natural sanction 7
11. The ethical sanction is a command similar to the logical rule 8
12. The aesthetic point of view; as little in ethics as in logic
the right one 9
13. Kant’s Categorical Imperative an impracticable fiction 10
14. Necessity for preliminary psychological inquiries 10
15. No willing without a final end 10
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