The origins of art; a psychological & sociological inquiryHirn, Y. (Yrjö)
Philosophy
The origins of art; a psychological & sociological inquiry
Hirn, Y. (Yrjö)
Aesthetics; Art -- Philosophy; Art, Primitive
According to the most consistent terminology, this tendency to
enhance feeling by voluntary co-operation with functional inhibition
ought perhaps to be considered as the characteristic expression of
painful emotion. It is, however, as has already been pointed out in
our treatment of sensation-feeling, more in conformity with ordinary
usage—and also with etymology—to apply the word expression to those
active, outward manifestations by which the inhibition is relieved.
There can be no inconvenience in doing so if we only keep constantly
in mind the distinction between the expression which enhances and the
expression which relieves. As long as these two notions are confounded,
a consistent explanation of emotional states is quite impossible. The
contradictions in Professor James’ brilliant chapter on the emotions
furnish us with a ready proof of this impossibility. If he had based
his theory upon a close discrimination of either class of expression,
as they can be distinguished in simple sensational feeling, he would
probably not have contended that sorrow is increased by sobbing,[71]
while admitting in another passage that “dry and shrunken sorrow” is
more painful than any “crying fit.”[72]
It is, however, impossible to deny that sighing, sobbing, twisting
the hands, and other active manifestations are often effectively
used, by actors, for example, as means for working up despair or
sorrows.[73] But it seems to us indubitable that these movements when
they succeed in creating the real feeling do so by help of association.
A pain-emotion which has been called into existence by such dramatic
mechanism is therefore seldom quite genuine. Real sorrow, hate, or
anger, as pain-feelings, are on their physiological side much more
deeply seated than these surface expressions, which, properly speaking,
are merely a reproduction of the usual reactions upon the primary
feeling. They are therefore not to be easily stirred up by aid of
mimetic action.
It may perhaps be contended that these remarks apply only to
the artificial creation of pain-emotion. When under the sway of
veritable sorrow we undoubtedly feel as if the mental state were
really intensified during its expression by the direct influence of
the muscular activities, which constitute the sighing, sobbing, or
crying. As far as the compound emotion is concerned, this observation
is unquestionably correct. Sorrow, with all its intellectual and
volitional elements, may become more distinct for consciousness the
more it is actively expressed. But the pain itself, which constitutes
the primary and initial state of this emotion, has by no means been
increased. On the contrary, a crying fit, for instance, as even
Professor James admits, may be accompanied by a kind of excitement
which has a peculiar tone of pungent pleasure.[74]
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