I. The exceptional importance of the economic union of the Central Empires, and the danger for the Allies of establishing a connexion between that union and their own economic measures after the war, p. 159.—II. Reasons for the Turko-German dodge of making a separate peace between the Ottoman empire and the Allies, p. 167.—III. Why a separate and premature peace with Bulgaria would play the Pangerman game, p. 174. CHAPTER IX THE STILL NEUTRAL STATES WHOSE INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE DIRECTLY THREATENED BY THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE “HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF” SCHEME AND THEREFORE BY GERMANY’S CAPTURE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 183 I. The example of Portugal, p. 183.—II. Holland, p. 187.—III. Switzerland, p. 191.—IV. The States of South America, p. 193.—V. The United States, p. 198. CONCLUSIONS What has been set forth in the preceding nine chapters appears to justify the following conclusions 213 MAPS PAGE The Poles in the East of Germany 1 The Danes in Prussia 2 The Germans and the non-Germans in Austria-Hungary 3 The Pangerman plan of 1911 12 The Antigermanic barrier in the Balkans after the treaty of Bukarest (10th August, 1913) 28 The nationalities in Austria-Hungary 32 The three barriers of Antigermanic peoples in the Balkans and in Austria-Hungary 43 The German claims in the West (beginning of 1916) 46 The German claims in the East 53 The German claims in the South and South-East 57 The plan of 1911 and the extent of its execution at the beginning of 1916 64 The great political questions raised by the war 68 The German fortress at the beginning of 1916 72 The consequences of the dodge called “The Drawn Game” 79 Asiatic consequences of the accomplishment of the scheme “From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” 95 World-wide consequences of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” scheme, as provided for by the plan of 1911 101 The crucial point of the European problem 113 Great Bulgaria 133