The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803 — Volume 04 of 55: 1576-1582; Explorations by Early Navigators, Descriptions of the Islands and Their Peoples, Their History and Records of the Catholic Missions, as Related in Contemporaneous Books and Manuscripts, Showing the Political, Economic, Commercial and Religious Conditions of Those Islands from Their Earliest Relations with European Nations to the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century
History
The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803 — Volume 04 of 55: 1576-1582; Explorations by Early Navigators, Descriptions of the Islands and Their Peoples, Their History and Records of the Catholic Missions, as Related in Contemporaneous Books and Manuscripts, Showing the Political, Economic, Commercial and Religious Conditions of Those Islands from Their Earliest Relations with European Nations to the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century
Demarcation line of Alexander VI; Missions -- Philippines; Philippines -- Discovery and exploration; Philippines -- History -- Sources
31. The master-of-camp only made some ambuscades, prolonging the
siege. It is certain that the Spaniards never fought the Chinese with
all their men, force to force. Although the Chinese leader sent out
five hundred or six hundred men, who pretended to show fight, they
generally fled when fifty of the Spaniards came out. It is certain
that, force to force, the Chinese would not wait to fight; and if
by the help of God they remained they would be routed, although they
had three times as many men, for they are not a warlike race. It is
also certain, and all acknowledge it to be true, that the Spaniards
desired to fight hand to hand, and to make the assault. They always
did their duty, fighting like valiant men, although there were some
cowardly ones, as all bodies have their weak side.
32. On account of the space given to the corsair, the latter was able
to delay things and to do some damage. For instance some soldiers were
imprudently sent to form some small ambuscades; but the Chinese were
warned of them, and made a counter ambuscade. Of the seven soldiers
who left the camp, the Chinese killed and captured five, and the
other two fled. It was exceedingly foolhardy to send so few men out
in a case like this, and caused great harm, for it made the Chinese
more daring. The master-of-camp left camp with about twenty men to
form another ambuscade, contrary to the advice of the captains. This
also proved unsuccessful, although, as help came, the Chinese retired
without doing any damage.
33. As the corsair had no ships, he sent men out to cut wood, and
as all his soldiers were good workmen, they soon constructed thirty
ships within the fort. With these he set sail at noon on the fourth
of August, having been besieged within the fortifications for over
four months. He directed his ships toward his own country, but, as he
left, he committed some damage with the "Vigilantib." At this time
the Spaniards feared that, when the ships were leaving, they were
about to attack them; and that some column was about to take them in
the rear. For this reason they fortified their rear-guard strongly
when the corsair left. It was ludicrous to expect that the Chinese
were coming to attack them, when with all their squadrons they never
dared once to measure their strength with ours.
34. Before this the Spaniards had filled the river with stakes,
to retard the progress of the corsair, but the latter removed
them. He compelled some of his men to enter the water; and ropes
being tied to the shoulders of these men, they removed, although with
considerable difficulty, a sufficient number of the stakes to clear
the vessels. While he was removing the stakes, the Spaniards stationed
arquebusiers and as large a force as they were able; but in this there
was negligence in not opposing the enemy with better arquebusiers.
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