The Philosophic Grammar of American Languages, as Set Forth by Wilhelm von Humboldt: With the Translation of an Unpublished Memoir by Him on the American VerbBrinton, Daniel G. (Daniel Garrison)
Philosophy
The Philosophic Grammar of American Languages, as Set Forth by Wilhelm von Humboldt: With the Translation of an Unpublished Memoir by Him on the American Verb
Brinton, Daniel G. (Daniel Garrison)
Grammar, Comparative and general; Humboldt, Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1767-1835; Indians -- Languages
As languages of the higher class, one has but to name the cultivated
idioms of Asia and Europe, Sanscrit, Greek and Latin, in order to
apply to them the above statement. It is still more necessary,
however, to understand thoroughly the structure of those languages
which are on a lower plane, partly because this will convince us of
the correctness of the classification, partly because these tongues
are less generally known.
It is enough to take up some single leading grammatical relation. I
select for this purpose the verb as the most important part of speech,
with which most of the others come into relation, and which completes
the formation of the sentence, the grammatical purpose of all
language--and often embraces it wholly in itself. But I shall confine
myself solely to that which makes the verb a verb, the characteristic
notation of its peculiar verbal nature. In every language this point
is the most important and the most difficult, and cannot be made too
clear to throw light upon the whole of the language. Linguistic
character can be ascertained through this point in the shortest and
most certain manner.
The verb is the union of the subject and predicate of the sentence by
means of the notion of Being; yet not of every predicate. The
attribute which is united to the substance by the verb must be an
energic one, a participial. The substance is represented in the verb
as in motion, as connecting the Being with the energic attribute. By
means of this representation, and the peculiar nature of the
attribute, the verb is distinguished from the mere logical copula,
with which it is liable to be confounded if these ideas are not
understood. If the verb is explained merely as a synthesis of Being
with any other attribute, then the origin of the tenses cannot be
wholly derived from one idea, for the idea of time alone would allow
only a three-fold distinction. Moreover, in such case the true and
efficient nature of the verb is misunderstood. In the sentence, “The
man is good,” the verb is not a synthesis of the adjective “good” with
the substantive, but it is a participial of the energic attribute “to
be good,” which contains a condition, having beginning, middle and
end, and consequently resembles an action. Fully analyzed, the
sentence would be, “He is being good.” Where the substantive verb
stands without a visible predicate, as in the sentence, “I am,” then
the verb “to be” has itself as the object of a synthesis, “I am
being.” But as rude nations would find this difficult to comprehend,
the verb “to be” is either entirely lacking, as in many American
languages, or else it has an original material sense, and is
confounded with “to stand,” “to give,” “to eat,” etc., and thus
indicates Being as identical with the most familiar occupations.
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