The third premise which says, that that which cannot be separated from a created thing is itself created, is equivocal, for it can be understood in two ways: the thing which cannot be separated from the class of created things, but can be removed from its units; and that which cannot be separated from any one of the things in question, as if one were to say, “That which cannot be separated from this blackness in question.” The second meaning is the correct one, that is it cannot be separated from a certain accident, which is created, for it is absolutely necessary that it should also be a created thing. For if it be eternal it becomes devoid of that accident, from which we suppose that it cannot separate. This separation is impossible. The first explanation, and that is which they mean, does not necessarily involve the creation of place, that is, that which is not separated from the class of created things. For it is possible to imagine a single place, that is, a body upon which follow accidents without limit, either opposed to one another or otherwise, as you were to say, movements without limit. Such is the opinion of many ancient philosophers about the universe, that it is made little by little. This is why, when the Mutakallimun saw the weakness of this premise, they resolved to make it strong and secure, by making it clear, that according to them, limitless accidents cannot follow upon a single point. For they maintain that on this occasion it is necessary that there cannot be found any other accident, except that there be an unlimited number of accidents before it at the place in question. This helps them to the impossibility of their presence, for it is necessary that it should not be there, except after the completion of an unlimited number. As the limitless never ends, it follows that the thing which we have supposed should not be there. For instance, consider the movement of the heavenly bodies, as we know them today. If there were before it limitless movements, then it is inevitable that this particular movement should not occur. They give the example of a man, who said to another, “I will not give you this dinar, till I have given you before it a limitless number of dinars.” By this it is not possible for him to give the dinar in question at all. But this example is not a correct one. For in it there is a primary object, then a limit, and then another object between them, which is without limit. For he has said it in a limited time. So he has stipulated that he would give the dinar between the time in which he is, and the time of which he speaks, between which there is a time without limit. This is the period in which he would give him the dinars without limit, which is impossible. So it is quite clear that this example does not illustrate the object for which it is given. Their opinion that the existence of a thing which is found after limitless things, is impossible, is not correct in all the cases.