Renan spoke of Comte with extreme severity, and not without some disdain. He owned, however, that later on Comte’s name would be one of the most representative ones of this century, and he had himself strongly felt his influence. We must certainly take into account all the other French and foreign sources from which this mind at once so supple and so large, drew inspiration. But is it not from Comte, as much as from Hegel, that he learnt to regard history as the “sacred science of humanity,” to expect from it what before was demanded from theology, to transform the ancient dogmas of Providence and of optimism into the belief in the positive idea of progress, and finally to conceive that truth and goodness are not immutable and immoveable realities, but are realised by degrees through the effort of successive generations? These two examples will suffice to show the point of extreme diffusion which has been reached by the positive spirit. This spirit is so intimately mingled with the general thought of our time that we scarcely notice it, just as we do not pay attention to the air we breathe. History, romance, and, even poetry have reflected its influence and, being charged with it, have contributed to its diffusion. Contemporary Sociology is the creation of Comte; scientific Psychology, in a certain degree has also sprung from him. From all these signs, it is not rash to conclude that positive philosophy expresses some of the most characteristic tendencies of the age. We are therefore conforming to historical reality when we attach ourselves, in Comte’s work, to the philosophy which constitutes its most original, and up to the present time its most fruitful and living part. It matters little that he himself should only have considered it as a preliminary portion of his work. How often has the speculative effort made by a great thinker for the purpose of establishing practical conclusions proved to be of more enduring interest than those conclusions themselves! FOOTNOTES: [1] Lettres à Valat, p. 156-7 (25 Décembre 1824). [2] Lettres à Valat, p. 99. [3] Lettres à Valat, p. 128. [4] Revue Occidentale, 1881, I, p. 288. [5] Politique positive, II, p. XX. [6] V. book, I, ch. vi. p. [7] Correspondence de J. S. Mill et de Comte, Lettre de Comte du 14 juillet 1845, p. 456-7. [8] Correspondance de Comte and de Stuart Mill, p. 456-7. Lettre de Comte du 14 juillet 1845. BOOK I CHAPTER I THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM According to Comte, philosophy is destined to serve as a basis for morality, for politics and for religion. It is not an end in itself but a means to reach an end not otherwise attainable. Had Comte thought it possible to reorganise society without first reorganising morals, and to reorganise morals without first reorganising beliefs, he would not perhaps have written the six volumes of the “Cours de Philosophie positive” which occupied him from 1830 to 1842. He would have gone straight to what was of supreme interest.