The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's AesthetikHegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Aesthetics
Difficulties of this kind, and others like them, which have been raised
in respect to a thoroughly scientific treatment of fine art have been
borrowed from current ideas, points of view, and reflection, the more
systematic expansion of which we may read _ad nauseam_ in previous
literature, in particular French literature, upon the subject of beauty
and the fine arts. Such contain to some extent facts which have their
justification; in fact, elaborate arguments[6] are deduced therefrom,
which also are not without their tincture of apparent plausibility.
In this way, for instance, there is the fact that the configuration
of beauty is as multifold as the phenomenon of beauty is of universal
extension; from which we may conclude, if we care to do so, that a
universal impulse towards beauty is enclosed in our common nature,
and may yet further conceivably infer, that because the conceptions
of beauty are so countless in their variety and withal are obviously
something _particular_, it is impossible to secure laws of _universal_
validity either relatively to beauty or our taste for it.
Before turning away from such theories to the subject, as we ourselves
conceive it, it will be a necessary and preliminary task to discuss the
questions and objections raised above.
First, as to the _worthiness_ of art to form the object of scientific
inquiry, it is no doubt the case that art can be utilized as a mere
pastime in the service of pleasure and entertainment, either in the
embellishment of our surroundings, the imprinting of a delight-giving
surface to the external conditions of life, or the emphasis placed by
decoration on other objects. In these respects it is unquestionably no
independent or free art, but an art subservient to certain objects.
The kind of art, however, which _we_ ourselves propose to examine is
one which is _free_ in its aim and its means. That art in general can
serve other objects, and even be merely a pastime, is a relation which
it possesses in common with thought itself. From one point of view
thought likewise, as science subservient to other ends, can be used in
just the same way for finite purposes and means as they chance to crop
up, and as such serviceable faculty of science is not self-determined,
but determined by something alien to it. But, further, as distinct
from such subservience to particular objects, science is raised of its
own essential resources in free independence to truth, and exclusively
united with its own aims in discovering the true fulfillment in that
truth.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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