The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's AesthetikHegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Aesthetics
Fine art is not art in the true sense of the term until it is also
thus free, and its _highest_ function is only then satisfied when it
has established itself in a sphere which it shares with religion,
and philosophy, becoming thereby merely one mode and form through
which the _Divine_, the profoundest interests of mankind, and
spiritual truths of widest range, art brought home to consciousness
and expressed. It is in works of art that nations have deposited the
richest intuitions and ideas they possess; and not infrequently fine
art supplies a key of interpretation to the wisdom and religion of
peoples; in the case of many it is the only one. This is an attribute
which art shares in common with religion and philosophy, the peculiar
distinction in the case of art being that its presentation of the
most exalted subject-matter is in sensuous form, thereby bringing
them nearer to Nature and her mode of envisagement, that is closer
to our sensitive and emotional life. The world, into the profundity
of which thought penetrates, is a supersensuous one, a world which
to start with is posited as a Beyond in contrast to the immediacy of
ordinary conscious life and present sensation. It is the freedom of
reflecting consciousness which disengages itself from this immersion in
the "_this side_," or immediacy, in other words sensuous reality and
finitude. But the mind is able, too, to heal the _fracture_ which is
thus created in its progression. From the wealth of its own resources
it brings into being the works of fine art as the primary bond of
mediation between that which is exclusively external, sensuous and
transitory, and the medium of pure thought, between Nature and its
finite reality, and the infinite freedom of a reason which comprehends.
Now it was objected that the _element_[7] _of art_ was, if we view it
as a whole, of an _unworthy_ character, inasmuch as it consisted of
appearance and deceptions inseparable from such. Such a contention
would of course be justifiable, if we were entitled to assume that
appearance had no _locus standi_[8] at all. An appearance or show
is, however, essential to actuality. There could be no such thing as
truth if it did not appear, or, rather, let itself appear[9], were it
not further true for some _one_ thing or person, _for_ itself as also
_for_ spirit. Consequently it cannot be appearance in general against
which such an objection can be raised, but the particular mode of its
manifestation under which art makes actual what is essentially real
and true. If, then, the appearance, in the medium of which art gives
determinate existence to its creations, be defined as _deception_, such
an objection is in the first instance intelligible if we compare it
with the _external world_ of a phenomena, and its _immediate_ relation
to ourselves as material substance, or view it relatively to our own
world of emotions, that is our inward sensuous life. Both these are
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