The Philosophy of Health; Volume 1 (of 2): or, an exposition of the physical and mental constitution of manSmith, Southwood
Philosophy
The Philosophy of Health; Volume 1 (of 2): or, an exposition of the physical and mental constitution of man
Smith, Southwood
Hygiene; Physiology
healthy state of the organic, instead of accomplishing that end, only
produces bodily disease. Any attempt to extend the selfish principle
beyond what is compatible with the perfection of the sympathetic,
or the sympathetic beyond what is compatible with the perfection of
the selfish, instead of accomplishing the end in view, only produces
mental disease. Opposing and jarring actions, antagonizing and mutually
destructive powers, are combined in no other work of nature; and it
would be wonderful indeed were the only instance of it found in man,
the noblest of her works, and in the mind of man, the noblest part of
her noblest work.
No one supposes that there is any such inharmonious combination in
the organization of his physical frame, and the notion that it exists
in his mental constitution, as it is founded in the grossest ignorance,
so it is productive of incalculable mischief. In both, indeed, are
manifest two great powers, each distinct; each having its own peculiar
operation; and the one being subservient to the other, but both
conducing alike to one common end. By the addition of the apparatus of
the animal to that of the organic life, a nobler structure is built
up than could have been framed by the organic alone: by the addition
of the sympathetic to the selfish part of the mental constitution, a
happier being is formed than could have been produced by the selfish
alone. And as the organic might have existed without the animal life,
but by the addition of the animal a new and superior being is formed,
so might the selfish part of the mental constitution, and the pleasures
that flow from it, have existed alone; but by the addition of the
sympathetic, a sum is added to enjoyment, of the amount of which some
conception may be formed by considering what human life would be, with
every selfish appetite and faculty gratified in the fullest conceivable
degree, but without any admixture whatever of sympathetic or social
pleasure. Selfish enjoyment is not common. If any one set himself to
examine what at first view might seem a purely selfish pleasure, he
will soon be sensible that, of the elements composing any given state
of mind to which he would be willing to affix the term pleasurable,
a vast preponderance consists of sympathetic associations. The more
accurately he examine, and the farther he carry his analysis, the
stronger will become his conviction, that a purely selfish enjoyment,
that is, a truly pleasurable state of mind, in no degree, mediately or
immediately, connected with the pleasurable state of another mind, is
exceedingly rare.
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