In like manner there is pleasure in the performance of beneficent actions; in energetic, constant, and therefore ultimately successful exertions to advance the great interests of human kind, in art, in science, in philosophy, in education, in morals, in legislation, in government; whether those exertions are put forth in the study, the school, the senate, or any less observed though perhaps not less arduous nor less important field of labour. Exertions of this kind beget in those for whom, towards those by whom, they are made, benignant feelings—respect, veneration, gratitude, love. With such feelings the philosopher, the instructor, the legislator, the statesman, the philanthropist, knows that he is, or that, sooner or later, he will be regarded by his fellow men; and in this consciousness there is happiness: but this is another source of happiness perfectly distinct from that arising from the performance of beneficent actions; it is a new happiness superadded to the former, and, if possible, still more exquisite. Thus manifold is the beneficent operation of the sympathetic affection: thus admirable is the provision made in the constitution of our nature for the excitement and extension of this affection, and, through its instrumentality, for the multiplication and exaltation of enjoyment! In affections and actions of the class just referred to, and in the pleasures that result from them, there is much of the nature which is commonly termed moral. And the power to which the moral affections and actions are referred is usually and justly considered as the supreme faculty of the mind; for it is the regulator and guide of all the others; it is that by which they attain their proper and ultimate object. Of whatever pleasure human nature is capable in sensation, in idea, in appetite, in passion, in emotion, in affection, in action; whatever is productive of real pleasure, in contradistinction to what only cheats with the false hope of pleasure; whatever is productive of pure pleasure, in contradistinction to what is productive partly of pleasure and partly of pain, and consequently productive not of pure, but of mixed pleasure; whatever is productive of a great degree of pleasure in contradistinction to what is productive of a small degree of pleasure; whatever is productive of lasting pleasure, in contradistinction to what is productive of temporary pleasure; whatever is productive of ultimate pleasure, in contradistinction to what is productive of immediate pleasure, but ultimate pain; this greatest and most perfect pleasure it is the part of the moral faculty to discover. In the degree in which the operation of this faculty is correct and complete, it enables the human being to derive from every faculty of his nature the greatest, the purest, the most enduring pleasure; that is, the maximum of felicity. This is the proper scope and aim of the moral faculty; to this its right exercise is uniformly conducive; and