Here it must be noted that he does not claim that his solution of the third antinomy proves the fact of freedom. That, he held, no merely intellectual argument could prove. It only defends the possibility of freedom. The third division of the _Dialectic_ is an examination of the proofs of the existence of God. When we study Kant’s account of them, we find we are concerned not, as elsewhere in the _Dialectic_, with a conflict springing from the nature of reason itself, but with the relation of thought and conduct. Kant distinguishes three proofs of the existence of God--the ontological, the cosmological, and the physico-theological--but he maintains that the last two really rest upon and imply the first. The first, the ontological proof, is the argument that the very conception of a perfect being implies existence. It is the only proof of moral importance, inasmuch as it attempts to argue a priori that a being of perfect morality must exist. Kant’s answer to it is that, to argue that we could not conceive a perfect being unless we conceived that being’s existence, is to suppose that to conceive of a thing, and to conceive of the same thing existing, is to conceive of different things. Existence, he says, adds nothing to the concept of an object. Kant’s objection to the ontological proof has been criticised. But the proof either assumes that God is a being independent of and separate from the rest of reality, and then, as Kant says, we may conceive God as existing, but our conception not being necessitated, carries no necessity with it. (If I conceive a hundred dollars to be in my pocket, he says, I conceive them to be there; but that does not mean the dollars are there.) Or if we say that reality must be thought of as existing, the answer is, Yes, but must reality necessarily be thought of as morally perfect? It is this last assumption which alone makes the ontological proof worth proving; for arguments about the existence or non-existence of God are mere quarrels about words, except in so far as they are concerned with moral issues. But moral issues cannot be solved by a consideration of purely intellectual assumptions. The nature of the other two proofs of God’s existence makes this clear. The second, the cosmological, is the argument that if anything exists, something must necessarily exist. Kant’s answer is that this is sound so far as it goes, but it does not prove that what necessarily exists is a morally perfect being. The third, the physico-theological argument, is the familiar argument from design. Kant treats this argument with much greater respect than the other two, but insists that we must see how far it will carry us. If we are going to infer the nature of God from the nature of the world as we see it, we must do so honestly. But though we see design in the world, we do not see perfection, and on the basis of this argument we cannot ignore the imperfection and want of harmony