which is as patent as the harmony and design. Kant’s analysis of these proofs seems negative. Its real purport is to insist that religion cannot be dissociated from moral experience, that the knowledge of God, which is the concern of religion, is not got by intellectual speculation, but in the moral life. When he said that he had limited reason to make room for faith, he did not mean that men could not prove the existence of God, but might believe in it if they pleased. He meant that God is implied and known above all in moral action. His criticism of these classical proofs is thus the beginning of that revivified philosophy of religion whose chief representatives have been Schleiermacher and Ritschl. *CHAPTER VI* *KANT’S MORAL THEORY* Kant’s moral theory is an integral part of his philosophical system. If the _Critique of Pure Reason_ argues the impotence of reason in the sphere of speculation, the _Critique of Practical Reason_ affirms its sovereignty in the sphere of practice. The second _Critique_ is thus the complement of the first. Kant’s treatment of moral problems being largely the consequence of the conclusions of the first _Critique_, his moral theory is thus mainly metaphysical. The title of one of his works on moral theory, _Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals_, bears this out. There were, no doubt, other influences which had their effect on his conception of morality. He tells us himself that he was inspired by the teaching of Rousseau on the dignity and worth of man. He was undoubtedly repelled into a reaction against the sentimental school of Shaftesbury, which in its German adherents insisted on the agreeable and gentlemanly nature of virtue with an almost sickly sentiment. This reaction accounts for the extreme emphasis laid by Kant on the divorce between duty and any kind of inclination. But his doctrine as a whole can only be understood in the light of the conclusions of the first _Critique_.