From the whole history of the ancient world I shall adduce but two illustrations: first of all, the twofold mental or spiritual state of the primeval times; and, secondly, the highest reach of thought and knowledge which Greece attained in her most enlightened days, which are marked at once with the signs of first maturity and of earliest decline. From both these instances it will be my object to prove that truth invariably prevails in the beginning, and that it is always and every where prior to and antecedent to error. From the annals of modern history I shall in like manner bring before you only a few particularly fruitful instances. From such periods of the world’s history I propose to show that the problem of science, in its reference to life and its profitable application, admits not of any pure and complete solution; or that often after an opening of promise it suddenly takes a wrong direction, and so misses its true aim, and, consequently, the problem of the age remains unsolved. This examination of the actual relation subsisting between science and life as it has been, or still is, historically exhibited in this or that particular epoch, together with the difficulties and the questions which it suggests, will serve as an introduction to our entire theme. For this is nothing less than the satisfactory exposition and correct theory of the application of true science to life, and of their profitable combination. First of all, let us cast our glance back to the infancy of the human race. In these primeval times, we every where meet with legends and traditions of man’s divine origin, mixed up and interwoven with the fables and symbols of heathenism. Now we are accustomed to regard heathenism, or the religion of the Gentiles, as universally, and, without exception, false and idolatrous, or at least absurd and fabulous. But is this consistent with the natural course of things?--is it not probable, or, rather, necessary, that, in its beginning at least, this chaotic medley of symbols and legends must have had for its foundation some very simple form of error, if we must suppose that it was always, and even from the very first, nothing but error?