The position of science is quite different. For this rests on what is thoroughly human and inborn in man--the passion of longing; which, however, if it be maintained in its purity and perseveringly carried out, may, without doubt, pass over into a divine pursuit. Even the form of communication in science is human throughout, since it employs language as the intellectual medium for setting forth the truth. If, then, in this higher tendency, the full center of living and divine truth be attained, according to man’s utmost powers and ability, then, even here, a higher and divine power may, undoubtedly, intervene and co-operate therewith. But still, for such a case, no strictly-defined form, or external sanction and consecration, exists, and from the very essence of the thing, it is not to be looked for. That which is divine in science must, from its nature, move freely, and be devoid of all such forms. As a higher power, it must operate immediately, and must seek to establish its own law for itself, intermediate between religion and the state, or even in each of them alike, though still in a peculiar way of its own. Wherever it is genuine and unadulterated, then it will in no case come into collision with the actual laws either of one or of the other, even because truth is one and every where the same. But if science, in its external form, and in its social and political existence, should become entirely blended with religion and the spiritual class, being confined and restricted thereto, as was the case with the institution of castes among the Hindoos, which we have already noticed, and with the Egyptian priesthood, then we must fain admit that freedom, which the scientific spirit requires for its growth and development in the sphere assigned to it, would be too closely limited and checked by narrow and partial considerations. But if, on the other hand, it be possible for a false science to arrogate that spiritual and divine right of free action, which, unquestionably, is in a certain sense the prerogative of heavenly truth in its invisible kingdom, which the latter can neither misemploy, nor ever impede in its course, then such a supposition would account for the prevalence of error. It would also, at the same time, serve to illustrate the mode by which such a prejudice as the arrogated right of an unrestricted freedom of thought, or, rather, of the free and unchecked communication thereof, could ever have struck so deep a root in the human mind. But this is a claim which we can in no way recognize, or allow, as really founded in right and justice. Since, wherever, as is the case in this sphere of purely intellectual operation, all is immediate and without a definite form of external sanction, there any thing like right must at most be indefinite and individual.