The Philosophy of the ConditionedMansel, Henry Longueville
Religion
The Philosophy of the Conditioned
Mansel, Henry Longueville
Hamilton, William, Sir, 1788-1856; Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873. Examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy
The most important feature of this philosophical theology, and the one
which exhibits most clearly the practical difference between reason and
faith, is that, in dealing with theoretical difficulties, it does not
appeal to our knowledge, but to our ignorance: it does not profess to
offer a definite solution; it only tells us that we might find one if we
knew all. It does not profess, for example, to solve the apparent
contradiction between God's foreknowledge and man's free will; it does
not say, "This is the way in which God foreknows, and in this way His
foreknowledge is reconcileable with human freedom;" it only says, "The
contradiction is apparent, but need not be real. Freedom is incompatible
with God's foreknowledge, only on the supposition that God's
foreknowledge is like man's: if we knew exactly how the one differs from
the other, we might be able to see that what is incompatible with the one
is not so with the other. We cannot solve the difficulty, but we can
believe that there is a solution."
It is this open acknowledgment of our ignorance of the highest things
which makes this system of philosophy distasteful to many minds: it is
the absence of any similar acknowledgment which forms the attraction and
the seductiveness of Pantheism in one way, and of Positivism in another.
The pantheist is not troubled with the difficulty of reconciling the
philosophy of the absolute with belief in a personal God; for belief in a
personal God is no part of his creed. Like the Christian, he may profess
to acknowledge a first principle, one, and simple, and indivisible, and
unconditioned; but he has no need to give to this principle the name of
God, or to invest it with such attributes as are necessary to satisfy
man's religious wants. His God (so far as he acknowledges one at all) is
not the first principle and cause of all things, but the aggregate of the
whole--an universal substance underlying the world of phenomena, or an
universal process, carried on in and by the changes of things. Hence, as
Aristotle said of the Eleatics, that, by asserting all things to be one,
they annihilated causation, which is the production of one thing from
another, so it may be said of the various schools of Pantheism, that, by
maintaining all things to be God, they evade rather than solve the great
problem of philosophy, that of the relation between God and His
creatures. The positivist, on the other hand, escapes the difficulty by
an opposite course. He declines all inquiry into reality and causation,
and maintains that the only office of philosophy is to observe and
register the invariable relations of succession and similitude in
phenomena. He does not necessarily deny the existence of God; but his
personal belief, be it what it may, is a matter of utter indifference to
his system. Religion and philosophy may perhaps go on side by side; but
their provinces are wholly distinct, and therefore there is no need to
attempt a reconciliation between them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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