The Philosophy of the ConditionedMansel, Henry Longueville
Religion
The Philosophy of the Conditioned
Mansel, Henry Longueville
Hamilton, William, Sir, 1788-1856; Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873. Examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy
[N] _Works_, vol. i., p, 233.
[O] _Discussions_, p. 625.
Deny the Trinity; deny the Personality of God: there yet remains that
which no man can deny as the law of his own consciousness--_Time_.
Conditioned existence is existence in time: to attain to a philosophy of
the unconditioned, we must rise to the conception of existence out of
time. The attempt may be made in two ways, and in two only. Either we
may endeavour to conceive an absolutely first moment of time, beyond
which is an existence having no duration and no succession; or we may
endeavour to conceive time as an unlimited duration, containing an
infinite series of successive antecedents and consequents, each
conditioned in itself, but forming altogether an unconditioned whole. In
other words, we may endeavour, with the Eleatics, to conceive pure
existence apart and distinct from all phenomenal change; or we may
endeavour, with Heraclitus, to conceive the universe as a system of
incessant changes, immutable only in the law of its own mutability; for
these two systems may be regarded as the type of all subsequent
attempts. Both, however, alike aim at an object which is beyond positive
conception, and which can be accepted only as something to be believed in
spite of its inconceivability. To conceive an existence beyond the first
moment of time, and to connect that existence as cause with the
subsequent temporal succession of effects, we must conceive time itself
as non-existent and then commencing to exist. But when we make the
effort to conceive time as non-existent, we find it impossible to do
so. Time, as the universal condition of human consciousness, clings round
the very conception which strives to destroy it, clings round the
language in which we speak of an existence _before_ time. Nor are we more
successful when we attempt to conceive an infinite regress of time, and an
infinite series of dependent existences in time. To say nothing of the
direct contradiction involved in the notion of an unconditioned
_whole_,--a something completed,--composed of infinite parts--of parts
never completed,--even if we abandon the Whole, and with it the
Unconditioned, and attempt merely to conceive an infinite succession
of conditioned existences--conditioned, absurdly enough, by nothing
beyond themselves,--we find, that in order to do so, we must add moment to
moment for ever--a process which would require an eternity for its
accomplishment.[P] Moreover, the chain of dependent existences in this
infinite succession is not, like a mathematical series, composed of
abstract and homogeneous units; it is made up of divers phenomena, of a
regressive line of causes, each distinct from the other. Wherever,
therefore, I stop in my addition, I do not positively conceive the terms
which lie beyond. I apprehend them only as a series of unknown
_somethings_, of which I may believe _that_ they are, but am unable to
say _what_ they are.
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