The Philosophy of the Moral FeelingsAbercrombie, John
Religion
The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings
Abercrombie, John
Ethics
I. A habitual effort to cultivate a sense of the divine presence,--and
a habitual desire to have the whole moral condition regulated by this
impression. It implies, therefore, sacred respect to the character of
the Deity, and is opposed to every kind of profaneness, or aught by
which one might weaken, in himself or others, the reverential feeling
due towards the character, and even the name of the Almighty. This must
be extended, not to the outward conduct alone, but to the desires and
affections of the heart. There is a state of mind formerly referred to,
in which a desire, which the moral feelings disapprove, may not be
followed by volition; while the desire is still indulged, and the mind
is allowed to cherish it with some feeling of regret, or even to
luxuriate with a sense of pleasure in the imaginary gratification. In
the same manner, a malevolent affection to our fellow-men may be checked
from producing injurious conduct, while the feeling still rankles in the
heart, in the form of envy or hatred. These mental conditions, while
they are widely at variance with the healthy state of a rational and
responsible being, must be regarded by the Deity as constituting moral
guilt and moral degradation. Nor is it only on the mind, which
cherishes malevolent passions and impure desires and imaginations, that
the Holy One must look with a feeling of condemnation. There may be
another mental condition, in which the thoughts and desires are directed
to transient and frivolous objects, and thus run to waste amid the
trifles of the passing hour, without any feeling of the truths and
motives which demand the attention of moral beings. The pursuits of such
a man may have nothing in them that is referable either to impure desire
or malevolent affection. They may be the acquisition of wealth,--the
grasp after power,--the love of distinction,--or a devotedness to merely
trivial occupations;--while there is a total neglect of those great
concerns which really demand our chief and highest regard. Amid the
legitimate and even the laudable pursuits of ordinary life, we are too
apt to lose sight of those duties and responsibilities which attend a
state of moral discipline,--and that culture of the soul required as a
preparation for the future state of existence to which we are hastening.
But we cannot doubt that these considerations bear an important aspect
in the eye of the Deity; and that the mind in which they hold not a
habitual influence is contemplated by him as in a state of moral
destitution.
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