THE PRACTICAL JUDGMENT, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL 86 Practical taste and judgment--Practical judgment as historical judgment--Its Logic--Importance of the practical judgment--Difference between practical judgment and judgment of event--Progress in action and progress in Reality--Precedence of the Philosophy of the practical over the practical judgment--Confirmation of the philosophic incapacity of the psychological method. VII PRACTICAL DESCRIPTION, RULES AND CASUISTIC 103 Justification of the psychological method and of empirical and descriptive disciplines--Practical Description and its literature --Extension of practical description--Normative knowledge or rules: their nature--Utility of rules--The literature of rules and its apparent decadence--Relation between the arts (collections of rules) and philosophic doctrines--Casuistic: its nature and utility--Jurisprudence as casuistic. VIII CRITIQUE OF THE INVASIONS OF PHILOSOPHY INTO PRACTICAL DESCRIPTION AND INTO ITS DERIVATIVES 121 First form: tendency to generalize--Historical elements that persist in the generalizations--Second form: literary union of philosophy and empiria--Third form: attempt to put them in close connection--Science of the practical, and Metaphysic: various meanings--Injurious consequences of the invasions--1st, Dissolution of empirical concepts--Examples: war and peace, property and communism, and the like--Other examples--Misunderstandings on the part of the philosophers--Historical significance of such questions--2nd, False deduction of the empirical from the philosophic--Affirmations as to the contingent changed into philosophemes--Reasons for the rebellion against rules--Limits between philosophy and empiria. IX HISTORICAL NOTES 144 I. Distinction between history of the practical principle and history of liberation from the transcendental--II. Distinction of the practical from the theoretical--III. Minglings of the Philosophy of the practical with Description--Vain attempts at a definition of empirical concepts--Attempts at deduction--IV. Various questions--Practical nature of error--Practical taste--V. Doctrines of feeling--The Wolfians--Jacobi and Schleiermacher--Kant--Hegel--Opponents of the doctrine of the three faculties. Krug--Brentano. SECOND SECTION THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS DIALECTIC I NECESSITY AND FREEDOM IN THE VOLITIONAL ACT 173 The problem of freedom--Freedom of willing and freedom of action: critique of such distinction--The volitional act, both necessary and free--Comparison with the æsthetic activity--Critique of determinism and arbitrarism--General form of this antithesis: materialism and mysticism--Materialistic sophisms of determinism--Mysticism of doctrine of free will--Doctrine of necessity-liberty and idealism--Doctrine of double causality; of dualism and agnosticism--Its character of transaction and transition. II FREEDOM AND ITS OPPOSITE. GOOD AND EVIL 192