The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation, and Other EssaysVeblen, Thorstein
Philosophy
The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation, and Other Essays
Veblen, Thorstein
Economics; Science
[3] A broad exception may perhaps be taken at this point, to the effect
that this sketch of the growth of the scientific animus overlooks the
science of the Ancients. The scientific achievements of classical
antiquity are a less obscure topic to-day than ever before during modern
times, and the more there is known of them the larger is the credit
given them. But it is to be noted that, (_a_) the relatively large and
free growth of scientific inquiry in classical antiquity is to be found
in the relatively peaceable and industrial Greek communities (with an
industrial culture of unknown pre-Hellenic antiquity), and (_b_) that
the sciences best and chiefly cultivated were those which rest on a
mathematical basis, if not mathematical sciences in the simpler sense of
the term. Now, mathematics occupies a singular place among the sciences,
in that it is, in its pure form, a logical discipline simply; its
subject matter being the logic of quantity, and its researches being of
the nature of an analysis of the intellect's modes of dealing with
matters of quantity. Its generalisations are generalisations of logical
procedure, which are tested and verified by immediate self-observation.
Such a science is in a peculiar degree, but only in a peculiar degree,
independent of the detail-discipline of daily life, whether
technological or institutional; and, given the propensity--the
intellectual enterprise, or "idle curiosity"--to go into speculation in
such a field, the results can scarcely vary in a manner to make the
variants inconsistent among themselves; nor need the state of
institutions or the state of the industrial arts seriously color or
distort such analytical work in such a field. Mathematics is peculiarly
independent of cultural circumstances, since it deals analytically with
mankind's native gifts of logic, not with the ephemeral traits acquired
by habituation.
[4] "Natural laws," which are held to be not only correct formulations
of the sequence of cause and effect in a given situation but also
meritoriously right and equitable rules governing the run of events,
necessarily impute to the facts and events in question a tendency to a
good and equitable, if not beneficent, consummation; since it is
necessarily the consummation, the effect considered as an accomplished
outcome, that is to be adjudged good and equitable, if anything. Hence
these "natural laws," as traditionally conceived, are laws governing the
accomplishment of an end--that is to say, laws as to how a sequence of
cause and effect comes to rest in a final term.
WHY IS ECONOMICS NOT AN EVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE?[1]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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