The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey — John Shaqi
The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and DeweyGeyer, Denton Loring
Philosophy
The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey
Geyer, Denton Loring
Dewey, John, 1859-1952; James, William, 1842-1910; Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914; Pragmatism
The contrast between 'intellectual' and 'practical' seems to make his
position certain. If truth is tested by practical workings, _as
contrasted with_ intellectual workings, it cannot be said to be
limited to fulfilled expectation.
The statement that the soul is good _or_ true shows the same thing.
The relation of truth to extraneous values is here beyond question.
The other passages all bear, more or less obviously, in the same
direction.
As James keeps restating his position, there are many of the
definitions that could be interpreted to mean either values or
fulfillments, and even a few which seem to refer to fulfillment alone.
The two following examples can be taken to mean either:
"'Truth' in our ideas and beliefs means ... that ideas (which
themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far
as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of
our experience, to summarize them and get about among them by
conceptual short-cuts instead of following the interminable succession
of particular phenomena. Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak;
any idea that will carry us prosperously from one part of our
experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working
securely, simplifying, saving labor, is true for just so much, true in
so far forth, true instrumentally". (p.58).
"A new opinion counts as true just in proportion as it gratifies the
individual's desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his
beliefs in stock. It must both lean on old truth and grasp new fact;
and its success ... in doing this, is a matter for individual
appreciation. When old truth grows, then, by new truth's addition, it
is for subjective reasons. We are in the process and obey the reasons.
The new idea is truest which performs most felicitously its function
of satisfying this double urgency. It makes itself true, gets itself
classed as true, by the way it works." (p.64).
But we can turn from these to a paragraph in which truth seems to be
limited to fulfilled expectations alone.
"True ideas are those which we can assimilate, validate, corroborate,
and verify. False ideas are those which we cannot. That is the
practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that,
therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known
as....
"But what do validation and verification themselves pragmatically
mean? They again signify certain practical consequences of the
verified and validated idea.... They head us ... through the acts and
other ideas which they instigate, into or up to, or towards, other
parts of experience with which we feel all the while ... that the
original ideas remain in agreement. The connections and transitions
come to us from point to point as being progressive, harmonious,
satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an
idea's verification". (pp.201-202).
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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