_The Relation of Truth to Utility_--It seems certain from the foregoing that James means, at least at certain times, to define the true in terms of the valuable. Satisfaction he is using as satisfaction _by_ rather than satisfaction _of_. As we have pointed out, one may be satisfied of the correctness of one's idea without being at all satisfied by it. This distinction has been most clearly set forth by Boodin, in his discussion of 'What pragmatism is not', in the following words: "The truth satisfaction may run counter to any moral or esthetic satisfaction in the particular case. It may consist in the discovery that the friend we had backed had involved us in financial failure, that the picture we had bought from the catalogue description is anything but beautiful. But we are no longer uncertain as regards the truth. Our restlessness, so far as that particular curiosity is concerned, has come to an end".[9] [9] Boodin: Truth and Reality, pp. 193-4. It is clear then, that the discovery of truth is not to be identified with a predominantly satisfactory state of mind at the moment. Our state of mind at the moment may have only a grain of satisfaction, yet this is of so unique a kind and so entirely distinguishable from the other contents of the mind that it is perfectly practicable as a criterion. It is simply "the cessation of the irritation of a doubt", as Peirce puts it, or the feeling that my idea has led as it promised. The feeling of fulfilled expectation is thus a very distinct and recognizable _part_ of the whole general feeling commonly described as 'satisfaction'. When 'utility' in our ideas, therefore, means a momentary feeling of dominant satisfaction, truth cannot be identified with it. And neither, as I wish now to point out, can truth be identified with utility when utility means a long-run satisfactoriness, or satisfactoriness of the idea for a considerable number of people through a considerable period of time. The same objection arises here which we noted a moment ago--that the satisfaction may be quite indifferent to the special satisfaction arising from tests. As has been often shown, many ideas are satisfactory for a long period of time simply because they are _not_ subjected to tests. "A hope is not a hope, a fear is not a fear, once either is recognized as unfounded.... A delusion is delusion only so long as it is not known to be one. A mistake can be built upon only so long as it is not suspected".