The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and DeweyGeyer, Denton Loring
Philosophy
The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey
Geyer, Denton Loring
Dewey, John, 1859-1952; James, William, 1842-1910; Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914; Pragmatism
An idea's relation to the other parts of reality is conceived more
broadly. Thus pragmatism's "only test of probable truth is what works
best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and
combines with the collectivity of life's demands, nothing being
omitted. If theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in
particular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism possibly deny
God's existence? She could see no meaning in treating as 'not true' a
notion that was pragmatically so successful. What other kind of truth
could there be, for her, than all this _agreement with concrete
reality_"? (Pragmatism, p. 80, italics mine). Agreement with reality
here means ability to satisfy the sum of life's demands.
James considers that this leaves little room for license in the choice
of our beliefs. "Between the coercions of the sensible order and those
of the ideal order, our mind is thus wedged tightly". "Our (any)
theory must mediate between all previous truths and certain new
experiences. It must derange common sense and previous belief as
little as possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or
other that can be verified exactly. To 'work' means both these things;
and the squeeze is so tight that there is little loose play for any
hypothesis. Our theories are thus wedged and controlled as nothing
else is". "Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees
himself to be, between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from
the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so
well as he feels the immense pressure of objective control under which
our minds perform their operations". (Pragmatism, pp. 211, 217, 233).
Now on the contrary it immediately occurs to a reader that if reality
be simply "what truths have to take account of", and if
taking-account-of merely means agreeing in such a way as to satisfy
"the collectivity of life's demands", then the proportion in which
these parts of reality will count will vary enormously. One person may
find the 'previous-truths' part of reality to make such a strong
'demand' that he will disregard 'principles' or reasoning almost
entirely.
Another may disregard the 'sensational' part of reality, and give no
consideration whatever to 'scientific' results. These things, in fact,
are exactly the things that do take place. The opinionated person, the
crank, the fanatic, as well as the merely prejudiced, all refuse to
open their minds and give any particular consideration to such kinds
of evidence. There is therefore a great deal of room for license, and
a great deal of license practiced, when the agreement of our ideas
with reality means nothing more than their satisfactoriness to our
lives' demands.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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