In the last sentence there is a false disjunction. Truth, it is stated, must either be satisfactory (valuable) working, or a static logical relation. We have tried to show that it may simply mean reliable working or working that leads as it promised. This may be neither predominantly valuable working nor a static logical relation. _The Relation of Satisfaction to Agreement and Consistency._--James continually reasserts that he has 'remained an epistemological realist', that he has 'always postulated an independent reality', that ideas to be true must 'agree with reality', etc.[12] [12] For example, in the Meaning of Truth, pages 195 and 233. Reality he defines most clearly as follows: "'Reality' is in general what truths have to take account of.... "The first part of reality from this point of view is the flux of our sensations. Sensations are forced upon us.... Over their nature, order and quantity we have as good as no control.... "The second part of reality, as something that our beliefs must also take account of, is the _relations_ that obtain between their copies in our minds. This part falls into two sub-parts: (1) the relations that are mutable and accidental, as those of date and place; and (2) those that are fixed and essential because they are grounded on the inner nature of their terms. Both sorts of relation are matters of immediate perception. Both are 'facts'.... "The third part of reality, additional to these perceptions (tho largely based upon them), is the _previous truths_ of which every new inquiry takes account". (Pragmatism, p. 244). An idea's agreement with reality, or better with all those parts of reality, means a satisfactory relation of the idea to them. Relation to the sensational part of reality is found satisfactory when the idea leads to it without jar or discord. "... What do the words verification and validation themselves pragmatically mean? They again signify certain practical consequences of the verified and validated idea. It is hard to find any one phrase that characterizes these consequences better than the ordinary agreement-formula--just such consequences being what we have in mind when we say that our ideas 'agree' with reality. They lead us, namely, through the acts and other ideas which they instigate, into and up to, or towards, other parts of experience with which we feel all the while ... that the original ideas remain in agreement. The connections and transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive, harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification". (Pragmatism, pp. 201-2).