The Principles of Psychology, Volume 2 (of 2)James, William
Science
The Principles of Psychology, Volume 2 (of 2)
James, William
Psychology
I have dwelt upon the facts of color-contrast at such great length
because they form so good a text to comment on in my struggle
against the view that sensations are immutable psychic things which
coexist with higher mental functions. Both sensationalists and
intellectualists agree that such sensations exist. They _fuse_, say
the pure sensationalists, and _make_ the higher mental function;
they _are combined_ by activity of the Thinking Principle, say the
intellectualists. I myself have contended that they _do not exist_ in
or alongside of the higher mental function when that exists. The things
which arouse them exist; and the higher mental function also knows
these same things. But just as its knowledge of the things supersedes
and displaces their knowledge, so it supersedes and displaces them,
when it comes, being as much as they are a direct resultant of whatever
momentary brain-conditions may obtain. The psychological theory of
contrast, on the other hand, holds the sensations still to exist in
themselves unchanged before the mind, whilst the 'relating activity' of
the latter deals with them freely and settles to its own satisfaction
what each shall be, in view of what the others also are. Wundt says
expressly that the Law of Relativity is "not a law of sensation but
a law of Apperception;" and the word Apperception connotes with him
a higher intellectual spontaneity.[32] This way of taking things
belongs with the philosophy that looks at the _data_ of sense as
something earth-born and servile, and the 'relating of them together'
as something spiritual and free. Lo! the spirit can even change the
intrinsic quality of the sensible facts themselves if by so doing it
can relate them better to each other! But (apart from the difficulty of
seeing how changing the sensations should relate them better) is it not
manifest that the relations are part of the 'content' of consciousness,
part of the 'object,' just as much as the sensations are? Why ascribe
the former exclusively to the _knower_ and the latter to the _known_?
The _knower_ is in every case a unique pulse of thought corresponding
to a unique reaction of the brain upon its conditions. All that the
facts of contrast show us is that the _same real thing_ may give us
quite different sensations when the conditions alter, and that we
must therefore be careful which one to select as the thing's truest
representative.
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Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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