Another confusion, much more common than the denial of all objective character to sensations, is the assumption that they are all originally located _inside the body_ and are projected outward by a secondary act. This secondary judgment is always false, according to M. Taine, so far as the place of the sensation itself goes. But it happens to _hit_ a real object which is at the point towards which the sensation is projected; so we may call its result, according to this author, a _veridical hallucination_.[40] The word Sensation, to begin with, is constantly, in psychological literature, used as if it meant one and the same thing with the _physical impression_ either in the terminal organs or in the centres, which is its antecedent condition, and this notwithstanding that by sensation we mean a mental, not a physical, fact. But those who expressly mean by it a mental fact still leave to it a physical _place_, still think of it as objectively inhabiting the very neural tracts which occasion its appearance when they are excited; and then (going a step farther) they think that it must _place itself_ where _they_ place it, or be subjectively sensible of that place as its habitat in the first instance, and afterwards have to be _moved_ so as to appear elsewhere. All this seems highly confused and unintelligible. Consciousness, as we saw in an earlier chapter (vol. I p. 214) cannot properly be said to _inhabit_ any place. It has dynamic relations with the brain, and cognitive relations with everything and anything. From the one point of view _we_ may say that a sensation is in the same place with the brain (if we like), just as from the other point of view we may say that it is in the same place with whatever quality it may be cognizing. But the supposition that a sensation primitively _feels either itself or its object to be in the same place with the brain_ is absolutely groundless, and neither _a priori_ probability nor facts from experience can be adduced to show that such a deliverance forms any part of the original cognitive function of our sensibility. Where, then, do we feel the objects of our original sensations to be?