The principles of science : $b a treatise on logic and scientific methodJevons, William Stanley
Philosophy
The principles of science : $b a treatise on logic and scientific method
Jevons, William Stanley
Logic; Science -- Methodology
13. Does Abstraction imply Generalisation? 704
14. Discovery of Marks or Characteristics 708
15. Diagnostic Systems of Classification 710
16. Index Classifications 714
17. Classification in the Biological Sciences 718
18. Classification by Types 722
19. Natural Genera and Species 724
20. Unique or Exceptional Objects 728
21. Limits of Classification 730
BOOK VI.
CHAPTER XXXI.
REFLECTIONS ON THE RESULTS AND LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD.
1. Reflections on the Results and Limits of Scientific Method 735
2. The Meaning of Natural Law 737
3. Infiniteness of the Universe 738
4. The Indeterminate Problem of Creation 740
5. Hierarchy of Natural Laws 742
6. The Ambiguous Expression--“Uniformity of Nature” 745
7. Possible States of the Universe 749
8. Speculations on the Reconcentration of Energy 751
9. The Divergent Scope for New Discovery 752
10. Infinite Incompleteness of the Mathematical Sciences 754
11. The Reign of Law in Mental and Social Phenomena 759
12. The Theory of Evolution 761
13. Possibility of Divine Interference 765
14. Conclusion 766
INDEX 773
THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
Science arises from the discovery of Identity amidst Diversity. The
process may be described in different words, but our language must
always imply the presence of one common and necessary element. In
every act of inference or scientific method we are engaged about a
certain identity, sameness, similarity, likeness, resemblance, analogy,
equivalence or equality apparent between two objects. It is doubtful
whether an entirely isolated phenomenon could present itself to our
notice, since there must always be some points of similarity between
object and object. But in any case an isolated phenomenon could be
studied to no useful purpose. The whole value of science consists
in the power which it confers upon us of applying to one object the
knowledge acquired from like objects; and it is only so far, therefore,
as we can discover and register resemblances that we can turn our
observations to account.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account