The Psychological Origin and the Nature of ReligionLeuba, James H. (James Henry)
Religion
The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion
Leuba, James H. (James Henry)
Magic; Psychology, Religious
In his attempt to support the belief in the priority of Magic, Frazer, who
has put every student of Religion in his debt by his monumental work,
affirms its greater simplicity when compared with Religion. The opinion
itself is tenable, but the defence of it, made as it is from the
standpoint of the old English associationism, is unfortunately worthless.
'Magic,' he tells us, 'is nothing but a mistaken application of the very
simplest and most elementary process of the mind, namely, the association
of ideas by virtue of resemblance or contiguity,' while 'Religion assumes
the operation of conscious or personal agents, superior to man, behind the
visible screen of nature. Obviously the concept of personal agent is more
complex than a simple recognition of the similarity or contiguity of
ideas.... The very beasts associate the ideas of things that are like each
other or that have been found together in their experience.... But who
attributes to the animals a belief that the phenomena are worked by a
multitude of invisible animals or by one enormous and prodigiously strong
animal behind the scenes?'[24] It is undoubtedly true that the mind of
man tends to pass from an object to others like it, or experienced at the
same time, but this psychological fact does not in itself account for
Magic. The mind of animals is regulated in a similar manner. In
spring-time the sight of a feather makes the bird think of nest-building,
and the smell and sight of his master's coat brings the master to the
dog's mind. Yet animals do not practise the magical art. This fact should
be sufficient to make one realise the insufficiency of 'a simple
[mistaken] recognition of the similarity and contiguity of ideas' as an
explanation of the origin of Magic. An animal might observe the
colour-likeness between carrots and jaundice (not, however, unless
practical dealings with them had attracted his attention to the colour),
and 'coat' and 'master' might follow each other in a dog's mind. But in
order to treat the coat as he would the master, and in order to eat
carrots or give them to be eaten for the cure of jaundice, there is
required, in addition to the association, the belief that whatever is done
to the coat will be suffered by the master, and that the eating of carrots
will cure the disease. It is the existence of these ideas with their
motor and affective values and of their dynamic connection which makes
Magic possible in beings subject to the laws of association. This
fundamental difference between mere association of ideas and the essential
mental processes involved in Magic, Frazer has completely overlooked. The
difference may be further illustrated by the instance of a dog biting in a
rage the stick with which he is being beaten. He is indeed doing to the
stick what he would like to do to the man. But in attacking the stick he
does not conceive that, although the stick is not the man, the injury done
to it will hurt the man.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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