When the American Hide and Leather Company was formed a number of years ago, a prominent Boston leather merchant of my acquaintance, sold his business to the new organization for a round million dollars in preferred stock and bonds, and in the course of the next few years of more or less restless inoccupation he devoted himself to a systematic study of investment securities and general stock market conditions. The panic of 1907, when values were almost entirely lost sight of in the mad scramble to liquidate stocks, afforded a rare opportunity to view the follies of reckless speculation, and our astute leather merchant was quick to observe the importance of this salutary lesson. The recovery that followed was almost magical, and many who bought stocks at the low prices doubled their money in a few months. Then following this sharp recovery there was the natural setback when speculators undertook to convert their new wealth into cash. And this too proved a wholesome lesson to our new apprentice in the game of high finance. For some years he had held to the conservative practice of investing only in non-speculative bonds, but this proved to be a slow and monotonous process of enlarging his fortune; furthermore it was devoid of the exciting thrills experienced by those who make fortunes overnight. He thought the funds of widows and orphans ought properly to be invested in gilt edge bonds and mortgages, but for a man of his business sagacity, in the prime of life, to content himself with merely cashing his coupons every six months was to decline into a state of innocuous desuetude--a condition into which he was determined not to retrograde. To launch one’s bark into the rapidly shifting currents of fortune in the stock market and attempt to steer an even course is one of the surest preventives of _ennui_, and after deliberately weighing and analysing conditions from every conceivable angle our erstwhile leather merchant concluded that cutting a few coupons now and then was too tame an occupation for a man of his acumen and ambition. He informed his friends that after years of careful study of the “game,” he was convinced that the reason why people lost, was that while in theory they all had the right ideas, they all used wrong formulas in practice. He declared that the “public,” so-called, always “bought at the top and sold at the bottom”--a commonplace in stock market parlance, though not necessarily true. Also that the inclination of all speculators is to venture out beyond their depth, i. e., to buy more stocks than they can pay for, or protect by ample margin. This indiscretion he thought to be especially characteristic of those with but small capital, whose eagerness for large gains outstripped their conservatism and exposed them to the perils of abrupt and unexpected reactions and panics. He had never bought more hides and leather than he could pay for, either with his own funds or with money easily borrowed from banks; he would