Sixthly, as our next contest will be with a nation-in-arms, as the war will be in its character absolute, as its object will be the downfall of the foe, as not until the foe (whether it be Great Britain or not) lies powerless upon the ground will it be supposed possible to stop, as we shall have to contend against the utmost means, the utmost energy, the utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,--these points deserve the most serious consideration of every politician who aspires to guide the destinies of the Anglo-Saxon Race. CHAPTER IX STRATEGY Clausewitz defines strategy as "_the use of the battle to gain the object of the war_." War is "a chain of battles all strung together, one of which always brings on another."[40] The great thing in strategy is to win these battles one after the other till the enemy submits. "_The best strategy is always to be very strong, first, generally; secondly, at the decisive point._"[41] "In such an aspect we grant that the superiority of numbers is the most important factor in the result of a battle, only it must be sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating circumstances. The direct result of all this is that the _greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point_.[42] Whether the troops thus brought up are sufficient or not, we have then done in this respect all that our means allowed. This is _the first great principle of strategy_, as well suited for Greeks or Persians, or for Englishmen, or Mahrattas, as for French or Germans." It sounds so simple, and yet how many times has it not been done. How many generals have been ruined in consequence! SUPERIORITY IN NUMBERS WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR STRATEGIC CERTAINTY Clausewitz says, "It is a fact that we may search modern military history in vain for a battle (except Leuthen or Rosbach) in which an army has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no means uncommon in former times. Bonaparte, the greatest general of modern days, in all his great victorious battles, with one exception, that of Dresden 1813, had managed to assemble an army superior in numbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and when it was impossible for him to do so, as at Leipzig, Brienne, Laon, Waterloo, he was beaten."[43] "From this we may infer, in the present state of Europe, that it is very difficult for the most talented general to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now, if we see that double numbers are such a weight in the scale against even the greatest generals, we may be sure that in ordinary cases, in small as well as in great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but which need not be over _two to one_, will be sufficient to _ensure the victory_, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be."[44]