Before describing General Low's advance it is necessary to relate the circumstances under which the detachments under Captain Ross and Lieutenant Edwardes had, as mentioned above, suffered such signal loss. CHAPTER II CAPTAIN ROSS AND LIEUTENANT EDWARDES On the 1st of March, while Mr. Robertson with his escort was in Chitral and active hostilities had not yet commenced, a native officer had started from Mastuj with forty men and sixty boxes of ammunition for Chitral. He had proceeded for a couple of marches and had reached Buni, when he found the road broken and rumours reached him that he was to be attacked. He accordingly wrote to Lieutenant Moberly, the special duty officer with the Kashmir troops in Mastuj, telling him of the state of affairs and asking for instructions. Rumours had by now reached Mastuj that Sher Afzul had entered Chitral territory and that large numbers of the Chitralis had joined him. But he was said to have friendly intentions towards the British and all the local head men reported to Lieutenant Moberly that no organised attack upon a party of troops was at all likely. Still there was evidently a feeling of unrest abroad, and as a detachment of the 14th Sikhs under Captain Ross and Lieutenant Jones were now at Laspur, two marches on the Gilgit side of Mastuj, on their way up, Lieutenant Moberly wrote to ask Captain Ross to come on into Mastuj in a single march instead of two. This Captain Ross did, and on the evening of the 4th of March he started from Mastuj with fifty men to reinforce the Subadar, who was blocked at Buni. On the same day a detachment of twenty Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant J. S. Fowler, R.E., accompanied by Lieutenant S. M. Edwardes also arrived in Mastuj. The party were on their way to Chitral with engineering stores, and without halting at Mastuj they left on the following morning, March 5th, with the intention of overtaking the Subadar at Buni and with the combined party continuing the march to Chitral. That evening Captain Ross returned to Mastuj reporting that everything was quiet at Buni, and that Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler were to leave Buni on the 6th for Chitral with the ammunition escort. On the evening of March 6th Lieutenant Moberly received a note from Lieutenant Edwardes dated noon of the same day from Koragh, a small hamlet a few miles below Buni, saying that he heard he was to be attacked near Reshun, the first stage beyond Buni. Upon hearing of this Captain Ross at once moved from Mastuj, and also wrote to the officer commanding at Ghizr, the nearest post on the Gilgit side of the Shandur Pass, asking him to send up as many men as he could possibly spare to reinforce Mastuj. The strength of Captain Ross's party was 2 British Officers 1 Native Officer 6 Havildars (sergeants) 3 Naiks (corporals) 2 Buglers 82 Sepoys 1 Hospital-Assistant 8 Hospital followers 2 Cooks 2 Water-carriers 1 Lascar 1 Sweeper 2 Dhobis